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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
JOSEPH HOSKINS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20050506-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from convictions for robbery, a second degree felony, and 
assault, a class A misdemeanor. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2a-3(2)(e) (2002). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
I. Is testimony of two co-defendants identifying defendant as the third 
person involved in the robbery and as the man who hit the victim 
sufficient to support defendant's robbery and assault convictions? 
A trial court's ruling on a motion for directed verdict presents a question of law 
reviewed for correctness. State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289, f 85 988 P.2d 949. This 
Court upholds a trial court's denial of a motion for directed verdict "if, 'upon reviewing 
the evidence and all inferences that can be reasonably drawn from it,. . . some evidence 
exists from which a reasonable jury could find that the elements of the crime had been 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.5" Id. (quoting State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 1225 
(Utah 1989)). 
II. Should this Court reach defendant's unpreserved claim that the trial 
court improperly allowed the State to present expert evidence where 
defendant does not argue plain error on appeal? 
No standard of review applies to this issue. 
III. Did the trial court commit plain error in not sua sponte striking the 
prosecutor's closing argument which correctly explained that the jury 
need not search for doubt if none existed? 
Because defendant did not preserve this claim, this Court reviews it only for plain 
error. To establish plain error, defendant must show that trial error occurred, that the 
error should have been obvious to the trial court, and that he was prejudiced by the error. 
See State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, f 16, 94 P.3d 186. 
IV. Was defense counsel ineffective in not objecting to the prosecutor's 
closing argument? 
An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the first time on appeal 
presents a question of law. See State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, \ 6, 89 P.3d 162. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and evidentiary rules are attached 
at Addendum A: 
U.S. Const., Amend VI & XIV; 
Utah Const., art. I, §§ 7 & 12; 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (West 2004); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (West 2004); 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13 (West 2004); 
Utah R. Evid. 702. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On November 9, 2004, defendant was charged by information with one count of 
aggravated robbery, a first degree felony (R. 1-2). Defendant was bound over following 
his preliminary hearing (R. 18-19). After the trial court denied defendant's motion to 
dismiss, defendant filed a Notice of Alibi (R. 36-38, 40-41). 
On March 8, 2005, the State filed an amended information charging defendant 
with one count of robbery, a second degree felony, and one count of assault, a class A 
misdemeanor (R. 46-47). On March 8 and 9, 2005, defendant was tried before a jury. 
After the State's case-in-chief, defendant moved for a directed verdict, which the trial 
court denied (R. 133:293). The jury convicted defendant on both counts (R. 81, 88-89). 
Defendant was sentenced to one-to-fifteen years imprisonment for the robbery, to be 
served consecutive to any other sentence defendant was serving. He was sentenced to 
365 days imprisonment for the assault, to be served consecutive to his robbery sentence 
(R. 88-89). 
Defendant timely appealed (R. 98). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On August 17, 2004, Terranosha Jackman was smoking crack with five other 
people when she announced that she knew a man she could rob to get more money for 
drugs (R. 132:150, 152-53; R. 133:183, 187,217,246-47,278). Defendant and another 
man agreed to assist her (R. 132:152-53; R. 133:188-89, 221-22, 229, 248). In the course 
of the robbery, defendant hit the victim in the face, sending the victim into a heater and 
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breaking Open his ear (R. 132:65, 95-96, 98, 131, 160, 162, 164; R. 133:257, 266, 285). 
The three robbers then took the victim's wallet and cell phone, as well as the hotel phone 
(R. 132:66,99-100, 160, 162; R. 133:199,258-59,285). When they left, the victim lay 
on the floor in apuddle of blood (R. 132:162-63; R. 133:259, 261, 287). 
Terranosha Jackman, twenty-one years old at the time of trial, was thirteen years 
old when she started hanging out in the streets and using drugs (R. 132:139; R. 133:202, 
214). She paid for her drugs by prostituting (R. 133:214). Her street name was 
"Chocolate" (R. 132:167-68). 
Leslie Dean Powell was "an older, little guy" who had once been one of 
Chocolate's tricks (R. 132:79, 81, 115, 143-44; R. 133:179). In August 2004, Powell was 
living in a hotel room at the Ogden River Inn (R. 132:80, 109). Chocolate, who was 
using crack cocaine almost daily, would sometimes visit Powell looking for money to 
support her drug habit (R. 132:143-44; R. 133:178). Powell, an active alcoholic, knew 
that Chocolate used drugs (R. 132:78, 86-87, 111,116). Still, he gave her money a few 
times, not really caring how she spent it (R. 132:92; R. 133:178). 
On August 17, 2004, at about 4:00 a.m., Chocolate knocked on Powell's door and 
asked him for money (R. 132:65, 90, 143, 148; R. 133:179). Powell, who had been 
drinking, gave Chocolate $20 (R. 132:65, 86-87, 89-90, 113, 119, 148-49; R. 133:180-
81). Chocolate then made a brief telephone call, told Powell she would return later, and 
left(R. 132:65, 89-90, 119, 148-49; R. 133:180-82). 
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Shortly thereafter, Chocolate met up with a drug friend, Ellis Ringwood (R. 
132:148-49; R. 133:182, 243). Chocolate purchased $20 worth of crack from Ringwood 
(R. 132:149; R. 185-86). She smoked it with Ringwood in an apartment in Ogden (R. 
132:184, 186). Four other people were present, including defendant (R. 133:183, 217, 
246-47). Most of them were also smoking crack (R. 132:150; R. 133:187, 244-45). 
When Chocolate noticed that she was running out of drugs, she told Ringwood that 
she knew a trick from whom she could get more money (R. 132:152-53; R. 133:187, 
278). She said she just wanted some big guys to go with her to intimidate the man into 
giving her money (R. 132:153; R. 133:188, 221). Everyone in the room heard the 
conversation and wanted to assist Chocolate (R. 133:221, 230, 247-48, 277, 280). Ellis 
and defendant actually did (R. 132:152-53; R. 133:188-89, 221-22, 229, 248). 
Chocolate, Ringwood, and defendant soon left the apartment and headed to the 
Ogden River Inn (R. 133:223, 249). On the way, Chocolate told Ringwood and defendant 
what to do when they got there (R. 132:153; R. 133:223). 
They arrived at the Inn at about 5:30 a.m. (R. 132:65, 88, 120). After parking, 
Chocolate led the two men to Powell's door (R. 132:155). The men hid while Chocolate 
knocked on the door (R. 132:155-58; R. 133:191,251-52,281-82). When Powell opened 
the door, the two men revealed themselves and, with Chocolate, entered Powell's room 
(R. 132:65, 93, 122-23, 156-57; R. 133:192, 252, 282). 
Powell returned to the chair he had been sitting in near the room's table (R. 
132:95, 158, 253). Ringwood took the other chair at the table (R. 132:158; R. 133:224, 
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230, 252). Defendant stood next to or sat on the bed (R. 132:158-59; R. 133:224, 253). 
Chocolate then asked Powell for his money (R. 132:158; R. 133:193). When Powell told 
her that he did not have any more, Chocolate began rummaging through Powell's 
belongings at the back of the room (R. 132:158-59; R. 133:193, 253-54). 
Suddenly, Chocolate heard a loud thump (R. 132:164; R. 133:196, 224). When 
she turned to see what had happened, she saw Powell lying on the floor bleeding from his 
ear (R. 132:159-60, 162, 164; R. 133:257). Ringwood, still in his chair, looked stunned 
(R. 132:160, 164; R. 133:224-25, 230,266). Defendant had just punched Powell, sending 
him off his chair into a heater near the wall (R. 132:65, 95-96, 98, 131, 160; R. 133:257, 
266, 285). 
Immediately, defendant and Ringwood began searching through Powell's pants, 
removing them down to Powell's knees in the process (R. 132:65, 99, 161-62). 
Ringwood took Powell's wallet from his back pocket (R. 132:99; R. 133:258, 285). 
Defendant went through Powell's other pockets (R. 133:258-59, 285). Chocolate took the 
hotel room phone and Powell's cell phone so that Powell could not call the police (R. 
132:66,99-100, 160, 162; R. 133:199,259). 
When the three intruders left, Powell's head lay in a puddle of blood (R. 132:162-
63; R. 133:259, 261, 287). Powell would later receive over forty stitches to repair the 
damage to his ear (R. 132:68,100). 
After the three intruders left, Ringwood divvied up Powell's money and gave both 
Chocolate and defendant about sixty dollars (R. 132:166; R. 133:200, 225, 288). The 
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three then returned to a drug house, where they continued to smoke crack (R. 132:165-66; 
R. 133:200-01,261-62,288). 
Chocolate was arrested several weeks later (R. 133:215). After first denying her 
involvement in the robbery, she eventually confessed (R. 132:170-71, 204-05, 212-13). 
Under a plea agreement with the State, she pleaded guilty to a reduced charge of robbery 
in return for her agreement to testify honestly against defendant (R. 132:140; R. 133:177). 
Ringwood was arrested about two weeks after Chocolate (R. 133:264). He also 
initially denied any involvement in the robbery (R. 133:265, 293). However, he too 
eventually confessed (R. 133:265). He accepted the same plea bargain offered to 
Chocolate (R. 133:267,289). Defendant's trial followed. 
At trial, defendant called only one witness, Danielle Peterson, who was his former 
girlfriend and the mother of his child (R. 133:294-95). Peterson testified that she lived 
with defendant from May through August 2004 (R. 133:299). Her relationship with 
defendant during that period was rocky (R. 133:299). The two "[fjought a lot," and she 
would sometimes leave their home and sleep at her mother's (R. 133:300). 
Notwithstanding, Peterson was sure defendant was with her on the date of the robbery (R. 
133:295,299). 
On cross-examination, Peterson admitted that she did not know what day of the 
week August 17 was (R. 133:303). She testified, however, that defendant was with her at 
all times except when she was either working or staying at her mother's and when 
defendant returned to prison (R. 133:302-04, 306). Asked whether defendant had ever 
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"got out of your sight" during those times, Peterson testified, "Not that I recall" (R. 
133:307). 
Peterson also denied that defendant ever used drugs over that period (R. 133:306). 
She testified that she never saw defendant use drugs, did not know he was using them, 
and would not have tolerated his using them (R. 133:306). 
In rebuttal, the State called the lead officer in the case, who had spoken with 
Peterson prior to trial (R. 133:313). During their conversation, Peterson acknowledged 
that she did not know what day of the week August 17 was (R. 133:313). Peterson 
explained to the officer that defendant "was always home and that he was never outside 
of her sight and she was positive he was there that day despite she didn't know what day 
oftheweekitwas"(R. 133:313). 
The State then called defendant's parole officer to impeach Peterson concerning 
her knowledge of defendant's drug use (R. 133:314, 317-18; transcript excerpt attached at 
Addendum B). Defense counsel objected on the ground that the officer's testimony was 
inadmissible character evidence against defendant (R. 133:314-15; Addendum B). The 
trial court overruled counsel's objection (R. 133: 315-16; Addendum B). However, 
before the officer testified, the court instructed the jury that it could consider the officer's 
testimony "only for purposes of evaluating the credibility of Ms. Peterson.... [Y]ou 
should not take his testimony as in any way suggesting that the defendant has any 
particular character or may have done anything" (R. 133:317; Addendum B). 
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The officer then testified that he met with defendant on August 17, 2004, that he 
subjected defendant to a urinalysis test that day, and that the test results indicated cocaine, 
methamphetamine, and marijuana in defendant's system (R. 133:320-22; Addendum B). 
During the officer's testimony, defense counsel renewed his objection that "I don't 
think this has anything to do with impeachment of Ms. Peterson" (R. 133:320; Addendum 
B). At the end of the officer's testimony, counsel again objected, asking that the officer's 
testimony "be stricken in that it in no[] way showed credibility towards the prior witness, 
Ms. Peterson, in this matter. It was only toward the character of my client" (R. 133:322; 
Addendum B). 
The trial court denied defendant's motion (R. 133:323; Addendum B). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Issue I. Defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion for 
directed verdict made after the State's case-in-chief. Defendant does not claim, however, 
that the State failed to present any evidence supporting the elements of the crimes. 
Rather, he contends that the testimony of the State's two main witnesses—both of whom 
identified defendant as a participant in the crimes—was not credible. Because 
determination of the credibility of those witnesses fell within the exclusive province of 
the jury, defendant's claim fails. 
Issue II. Defendant claims that the trial court erred when it allowed the State to 
present rebuttal evidence concerning defendant's drug use around the time of the crimes. 
Defendant contends that the evidence was expert testimony which should have been 
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excluded because the State did not provide adequate statutory notice. This Court should 
reject defendant's claim because he did not raise it below and does not argue plain error 
on appeal. 
In any case, defendant's claim fails because (1) the parole officer's testimony was 
not obvious expert testimony; (2) even if the officer's testimony was obvious expert 
testimony, the officer's testimony was exempt by statute from the notice requirements; 
and (3) even if the officer's testimony was obvious expert testimony for which notice was 
required, defendant never asked for the relief provided under the statute. 
Issue III. Defendant claims that the trial court committed plain error when it did 
not sua sponte strike the prosecutor's closing argument that the jury did not have to seek 
out doubt before convicting defendant. 
In context, however, the prosecutor's statements correctly directed the jury not to 
seek out doubt if no reasonable doubt existed. Thus, the trial court did not err, let alone 
obviously err, in allowing them. 
Moreover, the jury's written instructions were replete with references to the State's 
duty to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the prosecutor's 
comments, even if obviously erroneous, were not prejudicial. 
Issue IV. Defendant claims that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance 
by not objecting to the prosecutor's closing argument that the jury did not have to seek 
out doubt before convicting defendant. However, the prosecutor's statements were not 
erroneous, let alone prejudicially so. Therefore, defendant cannot show either that his 
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counsel performed deficiently in not objecting to the prosecutor's correct statements or 
that he was prejudiced by his counsel's performance. Thus, defendant's claim fails. 
ARGUMENT 
L TESTIMONY OF TWO CO-DEFENDANTS IDENTIFYING 
DEFENDANT AS THE THIRD PERSON INVOLVED IN THE 
ROBBERY AND AS THE PERSON WHO HIT THE VICTIM WAS 
SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S ROBBERY AND 
ASSAULT CONVICTIONS 
Defendant claims that "the trial court committed error in failing to enter a directed 
verdict of a[c]quittal at the close of the prosecution's case." Aplt. Br. at 14 (capitalization 
and holding omitted). Defendant does not claim, however, that the evidence did not 
establish the elements of the crimes. See id at 26. Rather, defendant contends, "[t]he 
seminal problem in the case is that the only testimony that ties the Defendant to the crime 
was the testimony of two crack-cocaine addicts that had been high on cocaine . . . prior to 
the crime." Aplt. Br. at 16. Defendant's claim lacks merit. 
In making his claim, defendant "acknowledge^]" that both Terranosha Jackman 
and Ellis Ringwood, the two witnesses he challenges, "testified that the Defendant was at 
the scene of the crime and that he was the person who actually struck the victim." Aplt. 
Br. at 17. Defendant also acknowledges that both witnesses gave consistent testimony 
concerning how the robbery was conceived, how the threesome traveled to Powell's 
room, how they gained entry into the room, and generally what "occurre[d] inside the 
motel room." Aplt. Br. at 17-18. 
11 
Defendant claims, however, that because these witnesses were high on cocaine at 
the time of the crimes, because their testimony was not completely consistent with each 
other or the victim, and because their testimony was inconsistent with prior statements 
each had made to the police, their testimony was insufficient to sustain defendant's 
convictions. See Aplt. Br. at 17-19. In other words, defendant argues, "the reasonable 
inferences are so 'inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime." Aplt. Br. at 20. 
When a defendant challenges a trial court's denial of a motion for directed verdict, 
this Court will uphold the denial "if, 'upon reviewing the evidence and all inferences that 
can be reasonably drawn from it,. . . some evidence exists from which a reasonable jury 
could find that the elements of the crime had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.'" 
State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289, % 8, 988 P.2d 949 (quoting State v. Dibello, 780 
P.2dl221, 1225 (Utah 1989)). 
This Court '"do[es] not sit as a second trier of fact.'" State v. Mead, 2001 UT 58, <|j 
67, 27 P.3d 1115 (quoting State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30, f 16, 25 P.3d 985). Rather, "'[i]t is 
the exclusive function of the jury to weigh the evidence and to determine the credibility of 
the witnesses."" Id. (quotingBoyd, 2001 UT 30, ^16) (emphasis in original). "'So long 
as there is some evidence, including reasonable inferences, from which findings of all the 
requisite elements of the crime can reasonably be made, [this Court's] inquiry stops.'" Id. 
(quoting Boyd, 2001 UT 30, f 16). 
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Here, as defendant concedes, the testimony of Terranosha Jackman and Ellis 
Ringwood provided "some evidence/' Mead, 2001 UT 58, ^ 67 (citaiton omitted), from 
which the jury could reasonably conclude that defendant robbed and assaulted Leslie 
Powell on August 17, 2004. See Aplt. Br. at 17. Given that evidence, it became "the 
exclusive function of the jury" to consider the inconsistencies in the witnesses' 
testimonies and prior statements and "to determine the credibility of the witnesses" in 
light of those inconsistencies. Mead, 2001 UT 58, % 67 (internal quotation marks, 
citation, and emphasis omitted). 
Defendant's insufficiency of the evidence claim, therefore, fails. 
II. THIS COURT SHOULD REJECT DEFENDANT'S UNPRESERVED 
CLAIM THAT THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY ALLOWED 
THE STATE TO PRESENT EXPERT EVIDENCE WHERE 
DEFENDANT DOES NOT ARGUE PLAIN ERROR 
Defendant claims that "the trial court committed reversible error in ruling to admit 
expert testimony of Officer Tolman regarding a flash test of the defendant's urine." Aplt. 
Br. at 20 (capitalization and holding omitted). Defendant argues that the trial court's 
decision violated an evidentiary statute requiring that "the offering party . . . give at least 
30-days notice to the opposing party" before expert testimony may be admitted. Aplt. Br. 
13 
at 20 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13 (West 2004)).l Because defendant did not raise 
this claim below and does not argue plain error on appeal, defendant's claim fails. 
The general rule in criminal cases is that "'a contemporaneous objection or some 
form of specific preservation of claims of error must be made a part of the trial court 
record before an appellate court will review such claim on appeal.55' State v. Johnson, 
114 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah 1989) (citation omitted); see also State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 
74,111, 10 P.3d 346. The objection must "be specific enough to give the trial court 
notice of the very error . . . complained of,55 Beehive Medical Elecs.} Inc. v. Square D. 
Co., 669 P.2d 859, 860 (Utah 1983), so that the court "might have an opportunity to 
correct [it] if [the court] deems it proper,55 Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City v. 
Barrutia, 526 P.2d 47, 51 (Utah 1974); see also State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, \13, 95 P.3d 
276 (holding that "issue must be 'sufficiently raised to a level of consciousness before the 
trial court and must be supported by evidence or relevant authority555) (citation omitted). 
This preservation rule "applies to every claim . . . unless a defendant can 
demonstrate that 'exceptional circumstances5 exist or 'plain error5 occurred.55 Holgate, 
2000 UT 74, ^  11 (citations omitted). If a defendant "does not argue that exceptional 
circumstances or plain error justifies review of the issue,55 this Court will "decline to 
!Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(l)(a) provides: 
If the prosecution or the defense intends to call any expert to testify 
in a felony case at trial or any hearing . . . , the party intending to call 
the expert shall give notice to the opposing party as soon as 
practicable but not less than 30 days before trial or ten days before 
the hearing. 
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consider it on appeal.55 State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995); see also 
State v. Pinder, 2005 UT 15,145, 114 P.3d 551; State v. Mead, 2001 UT 58, % 35, n.5, 27 
P.3d 1115. 
Here, the only objection defendant raised below was that the officer's testimony 
was improper character evidence against defendant (R. 133:314-15, 322 (transcript 
excerpt attached at Addendum B)). Defendant never objected to the evidence as improper 
expert evidence under section 77-17-13 (R. 133:314-23; Addendum B). Nor did he ever 
request the continuance to which section 77-17-13 entitled him if the evidence was in fact 
expert testimony (R. 133:314-23; Addendum B); see Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(4).2 
In sum, defendant never raised an objection under section 77-17-13 "specific 
enough to give the trial court notice of the very error . . , complained of." Beehive 
Medical Elecs., Inc., 669 P.2d at 860. Defendant, therefore, did not preserve this claim 
below. See Holgate, 2000 UT 74, % 11; Johnson, 114 P.2d at 1144; Beehive Medical 
Elecs., Inc., 669 P.2d at 860; Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City, 526 P.2d at 51; see 
also State v. Iran, 2004 UT App 347, \ 4 (memorandum decision) (holding that, because 
"Tran did not object to any testimony . . . as being expert testimony[,] . . . Tran did not 
present the trial court with an opportunity to rule upon whether any of the testimony as 
2Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(4)(a) (West 2004) provides: 
If the defendant or the prosecution fails to substantially comply with 
the requirements of this section, the opposing party shall, if 
necessary to prevent substantial prejudice, be entitled to a 
continuance of the trial or hearing sufficient to allow preparation to 
meet the testimony. 
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expert and thereby waived any objection") (citing Holgate, 2000 UT 74, \ 11) (copy of 
decision attached at Addendum C). 
Because defendant did not preserve this claim below, this Court may reach it only 
if "defendant can demonstrate that 'exceptional circumstances' exist or 'plain error' 
occurred." Holgate, 2000 UT 74, |^ 11 (citations omitted). Defendant has not argued 
either of those exceptions here. See Aplt. Br. at 21-27. Thus, this Court should not reach 
defendant's claim. See Pinder, 2005 UT 15,145; Mead, 2001 UT 58, \ 35, n.5; Pledger, 
896 P.2d at 1229 n.5. 
In any case, defendant cannot show plain error. To establish plain error, defendant 
must show 6"(0 An error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; 
and (iii) the error was harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a 
more favorable outcome for the [defendant].'" State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, 
Tj 16, 94 P.3d 186 (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993)). 
Defendant cannot make that showing here. 
First, the urinalysis test about which the parole officer testified is a routine test 
performed by parole officers (R. 133:320-21; Addendum B). Nothing in the record 
suggests that any special expertise is required to perform or interpret it (R. 133:320-21; 
Addendum B). See Utah R. Evid. 702 (defining expert testimony as that requiring 
"scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge"). Thus, to the extent the officer's 
testimony was expert testimony at all, it was not obviously so. 
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Second, although section 77-17-13 sets forth the general notice requirements that 
must be given when a party intends to call an expert witness, subsection (6) creates an 
exception to that general rule where the expert "is an employee of the state or its political 
divisions." Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(6). That subsection provides that the statute 
does not apply to the use of an expert who is an employee of the state 
or its political subdivisions, so long as the opposing party is on 
reasonable notice through general discovery that the expert may be 
called as a witness at trial, and the witness is made available to 
cooperatively consult with the opposing party upon reasonable 
notice. 
Id; see also State v. Torres-Garcia, 2006 UT App 45, ^  12, 15, Utah Adv. Rep. 
(copy attached at Addendum D). 
In this case, the challenged witness was a probation and parole officer with the 
Utah Department of Corrections (R. 133:317; Addendum B). Thus, even assuming 
arguendo that the officer's testimony was expert testimony, the State was exempt from the 
notice requirement under section 77-17-13 so long as defendant had "reasonable notice 
through general discovery that the expert may be called as a witness" and "the witness 
[was] made available to cooperatively consult with [defendant] upon reasonable notice." 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(6). Defendant never claimed below that he lacked notice that 
the officer might be called as a witness (R. 133:314-23; Addendum B). Nor did he ever 
claim that the witness had not been made available to him before trial (R. 133:314-23; 
Addendum B). Thus, even assuming the officer's testimony was expert testimony, the 
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trial court did not obviously err in admitting the evidence where subsection (6) allows 
such admission. 
Finally, even assuming the officer's testimony did require notice under section 77-
17-13, defendant never sought any of the remedies provided by the statute. The default 
remedy under section 77-17-13 for a party's failure to give notice of expert testimony is a 
continuance "sufficient to allow preparation to meet the testimony." See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-17-13(4)(a); see also Torres-Garcia, 2006 UT App. 45, \ 23. However, "the plain 
language of subsection (4)(a) grant[s] [defendant] the right to a continuance, the granting 
of which was contingent on his 'seeking or claiming' it." State v. Perez, 2002 UT App 
211, f 41, 52 P.3d 451. "In the absence of [such] a request, the trial court ha[s] no duty to 
order a continuance" under section 77-17-13(4)(a)). Id. Here, defendant never requested 
a continuance. Thus, the trial court "had no duty to order" one. Id. 
Defendant also never sought the statutory remedy of exclusion of the evidence 
under section 77-17-13 (4)(b).3 Even if he had, however, "[t]he remedy of exclusion . . . 
will only apply if the court finds that a party deliberately violated the provisions of this 
section." Id. Defendant never argued below that the prosecutor violated the notice 
statute, let alone that he had done so deliberately (R. 133:314-23; Addendum B). Thus, 
3Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(4)(b) provides: 
If the court finds that the failure to comply with this section is the 
result of bad faith on the part of any party or attorney, the court shall 
impose appropriate sanctions. The remedy of exclusion of the 
expert's testimony will only apply if the court finds that a party 
deliberately violated the provisions of this section. 
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exclusion of the evidence was never a possible remedy under the statute, even if the 
officer's testimony was expert testimony falling under the statute's notice requirements. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(4)(b). 
Defendant's unpreserved claim therefore fails. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PLAIN ERROR IN NOT 
SUA SPONTE STRIKING THE PROSECUTOR'S CLOSING 
ARGUMENT WHICH CORRECTLY EXPLAINED THAT THE 
JURY NEED NOT SEARCH FOR DOUBT IF NONE EXISTED 
Defendant claims that the trial court committed plain error in not striking the 
prosecutor's statements addressing reasonable doubt during closing argument. See Aplt. 
Br. at 27-37. Defendant claims that the prosecutor's statements were an obvious 
misstatement of the law that prejudiced him. See Aplt. Br. at 35-37. Defendant's claim 
lacks merit. 
As already stated, to establish plain error, defendant must show that trial error 
occurred, that the error should have been obvious to the trial court, and that he was 
prejudiced by the error. See State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, f 16, 94 P.3d 186. 
To establish error in closing argument, defendant must show that "the prosecutor's 
comments call[ed] the jurors' attention to matters not proper for their consideration and 
[that] the comments have a reasonable likelihood of prejudicing the jury by significantly 
influencing its verdict." State v. Reed, 2000 UT 68,«[ 18, 8 P.3d 1025 (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). "In applying this standard, 'the statements or conduct 
must be viewed in context.'" State v. Baker, 963 P.2d 801, 804 (Utah App. 1998) 
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(quoting State v. Hopkins, 782 P.2d 475, 480 (Utah 1989) (additional citation and 
quotation marks omitted). This Court "'considers] the comments both in context of the 
arguments advanced by both sides as well as in context of all the evidence.'" State v. 
Larsen, 2005 UT App 201, f 6, 113 P.3d 998 (quoting State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, 
156, 979 P.2d 799). 
Here, defendant's claim focuses on one paragraph in the prosecutor's initial 
closing argument. See Aplt. Br. at 27. In that paragraph, the prosecutor addressed the 
meaning of reasonable doubt in criminal cases: 
I want to talk about some of the things that you're supposed to 
use as a guide for your deliberations today. One is, reasonable 
doubt. The judge has instructed you on reasonable doubt. The 
reasonable doubt is Instruction No. 30. Sometimes you hear—it's 
used in the legal context sometimes and it bothers me when this is 
done. People say I know it's true beyond a shadow of a doubt or 
there's even a book, I think, a novel written about some courtroom 
case that said beyond a shadow of a doubt. Beyond a shadow of a 
doubt is not the test that you're required to apply. Your test is 
reason. You use reason. You're the reasonable man that we talked 
about. You're the reasonable person that's been brought here to 
consider this case and you don yt need to look for doubt. You don't 
need to search for doubt. If doubt doesn't exist, then don't find it 
and find the defendant guilty. You don yt have to go in worrying 
about reasonable doubt. 
(R. 133:336-37; closing arguments attached at Addendum E) (emphasis added). 
On appeal, defendant challenges the three emphasized statements in the 
prosecutor's argument. See Aplt. Br. at 27. Defendant contends that "[t]he very bedrock 
of criminal prosecutions is the principle that a criminal defendant is innocent until proven 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Aplt. Br. at 34. He asserts that the prosecutor's 
20 
statements were therefore "in clear contradiction to constitutional provisions, statutory 
law and extensive case law" requiring that juries apply a reasonable doubt standard in 
criminal cases. Id. 
In context, however, the prosecutor's statements were not improper. Rather, his 
statements accurately explained how the jury should apply the reasonable doubt standard 
in a criminal case. 
First, the prosecutor began his explanation by referring the jury to the court's 
instruction defining reasonable doubt (R. 133:336-37; Addendum E). Only after 
repeatedly focusing the jury's attention on the need to apply reason when determining 
whether doubt existed did the prosecutor state, "you don't need to look for doubt" and 
"[y]ou don't need to search for doubt" (R. 133:336; Addendum E). 
In context, then, the prosecutor was not asserting that the jury should ignore any 
doubts they have. Rather, he was merely explaining that the jury did not have to seek out 
doubts unsupported by reason. Thus, when the prosecutor asserted, "[i]f doubt doesn't 
exist, then don't find it," he clearly meant only that if reasonable doubt did not exist, the 
jury had no duty to imagine it. In other words, "[y]ou don't have to go in worrying about 
reasonable doubt" requiring anything more than the application of reason (R. 133:336; 
Addendum E). 
The prosecutor's statements were an accurate explanation of the law, perfectly 
consistent with the jury instruction to which the prosecutor referred and with Utah case 
law. See R. 74, Jury Instr. 30 (instructing the jury that "[reasonable doubt means doubt 
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that is based on reason" and not upon "fancy, imagination, speculation, [or] supposition") 
(jury instructions attached at Addendum F); see also State v. Reyes, 2005 UT 33, ^  26-
27, 116 P.3d 305 (explaining that concept of reasonable doubt does not require jury to 
seek out doubts where no reasonable doubts exist). 
The comments, therefore, did not "call the jurors' attention to matters not proper 
for their consideration." Reed, 2000 UT 68,118. To the contrary, as defendant's trial 
counsel acknowledged in his closing argument, they "informed [the jury that] the State 
has the burden here, beyond a reasonable doubt" (R. 133:353-54; Addendum E). 
Even if the prosecutor's comments could be construed as improper, defendant was 
not prejudiced by them. See Reed, 2000 UT 68, \ 18 (requiring defendant in prosecutorial 
misconduct claim to show that "the comments have a reasonable likelihood of prejudicing 
the jury by significantly influencing its verdict"). 
First, throughout the remainder of the prosecutor's argument, the prosecutor 
referred to the jury's duty to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. When 
reviewing the victim's testimony concerning his injury, the prosecutor asked, "Is there 
reason to doubt that?" (R. 133:340; Addendum E). Similarly, when reviewing 
Chocolate's testimony concerning how the robbery was conceived and planned, the 
prosecutor asked, "Is there any reason to doubt that that occurred?" (R. 133:342; 
Addendum E). And, in concluding his argument, the prosecutor asserted that "when you 
go into the jury room today [and] when you hold this case up to the cruel light of day . . . , 
you will find [defendant] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt" (R. 133:347; Addendum E). 
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See Larsen, 2005 UT App 201, f 6 (holding that, in considering whether comments were 
prejudicial, this Court "'considers] the comments . . . in context of the arguments 
advanced by both sides'") (citation omitted). 
Second, defense counsel had an opportunity to respond to the prosecutor's 
comments in his closing argument and used that opportunity to re-enforce the jury's 
obligation to apply the reasonable doubt standard: "As [the prosecutor] informed you, the 
State has the burden here, beyond a reasonable doubt. I submit to you that reasonable 
doubt exists here" (R. 133:354; Addendum E). See Larsen, 2005 UT App 201,16; cf. 
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1225 (Utah 1993) (holding that "defense counsel's 
remark[s] [in response may] help[] to ameliorate the harmful effect of the prosecutor's 
improper comment."). 
Third, the formal jury instructions were replete with references to the State's 
burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Jury Instruction 3 directed the jury to 
"decide the case based upon the law explained in these instructions and the evidence 
presented in court" (R. 55; Jury Instr. 3; Addendum F). Instruction 5 directed them that 
the State "has the burden of proving each of the essential elements of the charge beyond a 
reasonable doubt" (R. 55; Jury Instr. 5; Addendum F). Instruction 6 reiterated that it is 
the jury's "solemn responsibility to decide whether the State has proved the charge 
against the Defendant beyond a reasonable doubt" (R. 56; Jury Instr. 6; Addendum F). 
Instructions 24 and 25, the elements instructions in the case, both stated that the jury 
could convict defendant only if it found all the elements "beyond a reasonable doubt" (R. 
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70-71; Jury Instrs. 24, 25; Addendum F). Instructions 28 through 31 specifically 
addressed how the jury had to apply the "reasonable doubt" standard (R. 74-75; Jury 
Instrs. 28-31; Addendum F). Instruction 38, which addressed a defendant's right not to 
testify, stated that "[t]he burden remains with the State . . . to prove by the evidence 
[defendant's] guilt beyond a reasonable doubt" (R. 77; Jury Instr. 38; Addendum F). 
These instructions more than adequately cured any misstatements by the 
prosecutor. See State v. Longshaw, 961 P.2d 925, 929-30 (Utah App. 1998) (holding that 
instruction directing jury to be governed by jury instructions was sufficient to cure 
prosecutor's misstatement of law in closing argument; citing cases); see also State v. 
Kohl, 2000 UT 35, f 24, 999 P.2d 7 (rejecting prosecutorial misconduct claim where trial 
court gave immediate curative instruction and then additional curative instruction in 
overall jury instructions, concluding that "[djefendant has not shown, as is his burden, 
that the comment was so prejudicial as to defeat the mitigating effect of the court's two 
curative instructions"). 
Finally, the evidence against defendant was strong. Two witnesses—both of 
whom had already pleaded guilty to robbery and thus had no reason to falsely implicate 
defendant—gave consistent testimony identifying defendant as a participant in the 
robbery and as the person who assaulted of Leslie Dean Powell (R. 132:65, 95-96, 98, 
131, 152-53, 160, 162, 164; R. 133:188-89, 221-22, 229, 248, 257, 266, 285). The 
strength of the evidence further demonstrates that defendant was not prejudiced by the 
prosecutor's comments, even if they were erroneous. See Larsen, 2005 UT App 201, f^ 6 
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(holding that, in determining whether improper statements were prejudicial, this Court 
"'considers] the comments both in context of the arguments advanced by both sides as 
well as in context of all the evidence9"). 
In sum, the prosecutor's comments challenged on appeal were an accurate 
statement of the law. Even if they were not, however, defendant was not prejudiced by 
them. Thus, defendant's claim that the trial court committed plain error in not correcting 
them fails. 
IV. DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS NOT CONSTITUTIONALLY 
INEFFECTIVE IN NOT OBJECTING TO THE PROSECUTOR'S 
CLOSING ARGUMENT 
Defendant claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance when he 
failed to object to the prosecutor's comments "during closing argument.. . regarding 
reasonable doubt." Aplt. Br. at 41. Because defendant has not demonstrated either that 
the prosecutor's comments were error or that he was prejudiced by them, defendant's 
claim fails. 
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must demonstrate both 
that "counsel's performance was deficient, in that it fell below an objective standard of 
reasonable professional judgement," and that "counsel's deficient performance was 
prejudicial—i.e., that it affected the outcome of the case." State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 
76, \ 19, 12 P.3d 92 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984)); see 
also State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998) (citations omitted). 
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As demonstrated in the previous argument, the prosecutor's comments were not 
improper. See Point III supra at pp. 19-22. Thus, defense counsel was not deficient in 
not objecting to them. See State v. Wallace, 2005 Ut App 434, % 16, 124 P.3d 259 
('"[T]he failure of counsel to make motions or objections which would be futile if raised 
does not constitute ineffective assistance.'") (quoting State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96, f 34, 
989 P.2d 52). 
Moreover, as demonstrated in the previous argument, even if the prosecutor's 
remarks where erroneous, defendant was not prejudiced by them. See Point III supra at 
pp. 22-25. Thus, defendant could not have been prejudiced by his counsel's failure to 
object to them. See State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, % 22, 95 P.3d 276 (holding that plain 
error "harmfulness test is equivalent to the prejudice test applied in assessing claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel."); see also State v. Parker, 2000 UT 51, *[  10, 4 P.3d 
778 (same); State v. McLoud, 2005 UT App 466, ^ 16, 126 P.3d 775 (holding "where 
[defendant] has not shown prejudice, he cannot prevail on his claims of plain error and 
ineffective assistance of counsel"). 
Consequently, defendant's ineffective assistance claim fails. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State asks this Court to affirm defendant's 
convictions. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED Zj_ February 2006. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
KAREN A. KLUCZNTK 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Addenda 
Addendum A 
United States Const. Amend. VI 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime 
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascer-
tained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence. 
United States Const. Amend. XIV 
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject 
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall 
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws. 
Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States 
according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons 
in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any 
election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United 
States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a 
State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male 
inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the 
United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or 
other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the propor-
tion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of 
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or 
elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, 
under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an 
oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a 
member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any 
State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in 
insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the 
enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, 
remove such disability. 
Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by 
law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services 
in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither 
the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation 
incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any 
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations 
and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions of this article. 
Utah Const. Art. I, § 7 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
Utah Const. Art. I, § 12 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to 
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged 
to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance 
shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance 
money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be 
compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to 
testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any 
person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the 
function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause 
exists unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall 
preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in 
whole or in part at any preliminary examination to determine probable cause 
or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if 
appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (West 2004) 
(1) Assault is: 
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to 
another; 
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do 
bodily injury to another; or 
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes bodily 
injury to another or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another. 
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor. 
(3) Assault is a class A misdemeanor if: 
(a) the person causes substantial bodily injury to another; or 
(b) the victim is pregnant and the person has knowledge of the pregnancy. 
(4) It is not a defense against assault, that the accused caused serious bodily 
injury to another. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (West 2004) 
(1) A person commits robbery if: 
(a) the person unlawfully and intentionally takes or attempts to take 
personal property in the possession of another from his person, or immediate 
presence, against his will, by means of force or fear, and with a purpose or 
intent to deprive the person permanently or temporarily of the personal 
property; or 
(b) the person intentionally or knowingly uses force or fear of immediate 
force against another in the course of committing a theft or wrongful 
appropriation. 
(2) An act is considered to be "in the course of committing a theft or 
wrongful appropriation" if it occurs: 
(a) in the course of an attempt to commit theft or wrongful appropriation; 
(b) in the commission of theft or wrongful appropriation; or 
(c) in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission. 
(3) Robbery is a felony of the second degree. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13 (West 2004) 
(l)(a) If the prosecution or the defense intends to call any expert to testify in 
a felony case at trial or any hearing, excluding a preliminary hearing held 
pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, the party intending 
to call the expert shall give notice to the opposing party as soon as practicable 
but not less than 30 days before trial or ten days before the hearing. 
(b) Notice shall include the name and address of the expert, the expert's 
curriculum vitae, and one of the following: 
(i) a copy of the expert's report, if one exists; or 
(ii) a written explanation of the expert's proposed testimony sufficient to 
give the opposing party adequate notice to prepare to meet the testimony; 
and 
(iii) a notice that the expert is available to cooperatively consult with the 
opposing party on reasonable notice. 
(c) The party intending to call the expert is responsible for any fee charged 
by the expert for the consultation. 
(2) If an expert's anticipated testimony will be based in whole or part on the 
results of any tests or other specialized data, the party intending to call the 
witness shall provide to the opposing party the information upon request. 
(3) As soon as practicable after receipt of the expert's report or the informa-
tion concerning the expert's proposed testimony, the party receiving notice 
shall provide to the other party notice of witnesses whom the party anticipates 
calling to rebut the expert's testimony, including the information required 
under Subsection (l)(b). 
(4)(a) If the defendant or the prosecution fails to substantially comply with 
the requirements of this section, the opposing party shall, if necessary to 
prevent substantial prejudice, be entitled to a continuance of the trial or 
hearing sufficient to allow preparation to meet the testimony. 
(b) If the court finds that the failure to comply with this section is the 
result of bad faith on the part of any party or attorney, the court shall impose 
appropriate sanctions. The remedy of exclusion of the expert's testimony 
will only apply if the court finds that a party deliberately violated the 
provisions of this section. 
(5)(a) For purposes of this section, testimony of an expert at a preliminary 
hearing held pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
constitutes notice of the expert, the expert's qualifications, and a report of the 
expert's proposed trial testimony as to the subject matter testified to by the 
expert at the preliminary hearing. 
(b) Upon request, the party who called the expert at the preliminary 
hearing shall provide the opposing party with a copy of the expert's curricu-
lum vitae as soon as practicable prior to trial or any hearing at which the 
expert may be called as an expert witness. 
(6) This section does not apply to the use of an expert who is an employee of 
the state or its political subdivisions, so long as the opposing party is on 
reasonable notice through general discovery that the expert may be called as a 
witness at trial, and the witness is made available to cooperatively consult with 
the opposing party upon reasonable notice. 
Utah R. Evid. 702 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of 
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, 
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
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1 Q So you talked to her first in March? 
2 A I don't remember exactly what day it was. 
3 Q February? 
4 A Actually I spoke to her on March 3rd at 9:30 hours 
5 I think. Maybe not. I may be wrong. I don't remember 
6 exactly what day. 
7 Q So you don't remember what day it was? 
8 A It was - I talked to her on the phone from my 
9 office so — 
10 MR. BUSHELL: I have no further questions,Your 
11 Honor. 
12 THE COURT: Mr. Decaria? 
13 MR. DECARIA: I have nothing further. 
14 THE COURT: Thank you very much. 
15 MR. DECARIA: Call Eric Tolman to the stand. 
16 MR. BUSHELL: Your Honor, for the record I'd like 
17 to make an objection to Mr. Tolman if his testimony has 
18 anything to do with my client. If it's to impeach Ms. 
19 Peterson then it's fine but I will have a standing objection 
20 to any testimony he offers against Mr. Hoskins. 
21 THE COURT: I understand. Will he be used to 
22 impeach Ms. Peterson? 
23 MR. DECARIA: I want to approach the bench for one 
24 more minute, Your Honor. 
25 (Whereupon a sidebar was held) 
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1 THE COURT: Members of the jury. I warned you there 
2 may be conferences during the course of the trial. We're 
3 going to take a recess for about 15 minutes and we'll return 
4 at 4:15. 
5 (Whereupon a recess was taken) 
6 THE COURT: We're back on the record in this 
7 matter. Prior to our brief recess defense had objected to 
8 allowing the testimony of what was his name? Toland? 
9 MR. DECARIA: Mr. Tolman. 
10 THE COURT: Eric Tolman who I understand is the 
11 parole officer that supervised the defendant and I listened 
12 to the arguments of counsel and during the recess had an 
13 opportunity to look at the Rules of Evidence and I'm going to 
14 rule that that evidence is admissible for the purposes of 
15 impeaching the witness, Ms. Peterson, under Rule 404 and also 
16 as rebuttal evidence. 
17 Mr. Bushell? 
18 MR. BUSHELL: Your Honor, at this time I'd like my 
19 objection noted for the record on that. I believe that the 
20 testimony is going to be character in nature. Character in 
21 nature against my client. 
22 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Bushell. 
23 The Court also took into consideration as I 
24 mentioned in chambers that substantial testimony has been 
25 heard about the drug culture and it's relevant to this case 
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1 so I also took that into account. Plus you did mention in 
2 your opening argument that the defendant was on parole or 
3 probation, one or the other. So that door was opened as 
4 well. All right. 
5 I will give a cautionary instruction to the jury as 
6 requested and anything else before we invite them back in? 
7 MR. BUSHELL: No, Your Honor. 
8 THE COURT: Let's invite the jury back in Richard. 
9 (Whereupon the jury entered the courtroom) 
10 THE COURT: Good afternoon again. I understand the 
11 room you're in is getting warm. I apologize for that. There 
12 isn't a whole lot I can do about it at the moment. 
13 Prior to the recess, the prosecution indicated that 
14 it would like to call as a rebuttal witness, Eric Tolman. 
15 Now I instructed you yesterday and you may remember this, 
16 that some evidence is admitted for a limited purpose only and 
17 I told you then that if this happens, I'll tell you what you 
18 can do with that evidence. This is one of those cases. The 
19 testimony of Eric Tolman is to be used only for purposes of 
20 evaluating the credibility of Ms. Peterson. That is the only 
21 purpose he is being brought in to testify and you should not 
22 take his testimony as in any way suggesting that the 
23 defendant has any particular character or may have done 
24 anything. It's only to be used for purposes of putting her 
25 testimony in question. So it is impeachment testimony. 
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1 Mr. Decaria? 
2 MR. DECARIA: Yes. I would have Eric Tolman sworn. 
3 THE COURT: Mr. Tolman, please raise your right 
4 hand. 
5 ERIC TOLMAN 
6 having been first duly sworn, testified 
7 upon his oath as follows: 
8 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
9 BY MR. DECARIA: 
10 Q State your full name for the court please. 
11 A Eric Tolman. 
12 Q Thank you, Eric. You might want to pull that 
13 microphone down a little closer to you. Thank you. 
14 Where are you employed? 
15 A I'm employed by the Utah Department of Corrections. 
16 Q Okay. What are your duties there? 
17 A Probation and parole agent. 
18 Q Okay. How long have you been in that capacity? 
19 A Seven years. 
20 Q And so, because of assignment or your work with 
21 AP&P, is that what it is, Adult Probation and Parole? 
22 A Yes. 
23 Q Do you have occasion to supervise cases of 
24 individuals who have gotten themselves in some trouble? 
25 I A I do. 
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1 Q And do you happen to know Joe Hoskins? 
2 A I do. 
3 Q How long have you known Joe Hoskins? 
4 A Roughly a year now. 
5 Q And do you recall seeing him on August 6th? 
6 A On August 6? 
7 Q Yes. 
8 A No. I did not make contact with Mr. Hoskins on 
9 August 6. 
10 Q Now I'm talking about August 6 of 2004. 
11 A Correct. 
12 Q Did you make contact with him at some time near 
13 August 6? 
14 A On August 6 I attempted to make contact with him. 
15 Q Was he there? 
16 A He was not. 
17 Q Where did you go to do that? 
18 A At his home. 
19 Q And had you been to that home before? 
2 0 A I have. 
21 Q And did you know of his living arrangement? 
22 A I knew where he was living and with whom he was 
23 living. 
24 Q Okay. So where was he living? 
25 I A I can get the address exactly but I believe it was 
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1 336 27th Street. 
2 Q 27th and Kiessel; is that fair? 
3 A Yes. 
4 Q And who was he living with? 
5 A Danielle Peterson. 
6 Q And did you have occasion to see him sometime after 
7 that? 
8 A I did. 
9 Q When? 
10 A On August 10th and again on August 17th. 
11 Q Where did you make contact with him on August 10th? 
12 A In my office. 
13 Q And what was the purpose of that visit? 
14 A For him to check in for the month. 
15 Q So when he checked in, what was the requirement 
16 that you placed on him when he checked in? 
17 A He's required to — 
18 MR. BUSHELL: I'm going to object again. I don't 
19 know if this is going to the credibility of the witness 
20 rather than character evidence. 
21 MR. DECARIA: Yeah, I'll skip this. I think counsel 
22 J may be right and rather than worry about it, I'll just move 
23 I onto the date of the 17th. 
24 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Decaria. 
25 I MR. DECARIA: Thank you. 
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Q (BY MR. DECARIA) On August 17, 2004, you made 
contact with the defendant again; is that correct? 
A That is correct. 
Q And where were you at the time? 
A In my office. 
Q And was there an appointment for him to come in? 
A I don't recall exactly what precipitated the visit. 
Q He did come in? 
A He did. 
Q And what was the purpose of that visit? 
A Again, probably to check in. I'd probably asked 
him to come in and on that day I requested a urinalysis from 
him. 
Q Okay. So did you take urine from him? 
A I did. 
Q And did you witness the deposit of the urine? 
A I did. 
MR. BUSHELL: Your Honor, I'm going to object to 
this. I don't think this has anything to do with impeachment 
of Ms. Peterson. 
Q 
defendant 
you do 
A 
wi 
THE COURT: 
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Q 
A 
deposit d 
positive 
Q 
slide? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
defendant 
A 
Q 
How did you test it? 
We have a three, four, five-panel slides and we 
rops of urine onto the slide and it'll give us a 
or negative reading. 
Do you mix it with chemicals or just right on the 
Right on the slide. 
So at that time - okay, had you done this before? 
Yes. 
Not for this defendant but for many other 
s? 
Correct. 
And have you testified in court with regard to your 
1 use of this system? 
A 
1 ° 
A 
Q 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
No. 
You have not? This is the first time. 
First time. 
Tell me what the result of the test was. 
MR. BUSHELL: I object again. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
(BY MR. DECARIA) What was the result of the test? 
Mr. Hoskins was positive for controlled substances. 
Can you name the controlled substances? 
Yes, cocaine, methamphetamine, and THC. 
THC is? 
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Marijuana. 
MR. DECARIA: Okay. I have no further questions 
THE COURT: Thank you Mr. Decaria. Mr. Bushell? 
MR. BUSHELL: I have no question of this witness. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Bushell. 
Thank you very much, Mr. Tolman. You may step 
down, 
MR. BUSHELL: Your Honor, I would like to make a 
motion at this time. 
THE COURT: Please do so. 
MR. BUSHELL: Your Honor, I would move that the 
entire testimony of Mr. Tolman be stricken in that it in not 
way showed credibility towards the prior witness, Ms. 
Peterson, in this matter. It was only toward the character 
of my client. 
THE COURT: Mr. Decaria? 
MR. DECARIA: Your Honor, I'd respond by saying 
that her credibility as to her knowledge as to the 
whereabouts and the activities of the defendant are in 
question as soon as she testifies. When she testified, of 
course, that she never saw the defendant use drugs, had no 
knowledge 
all times, 
important 
his 
of his using 
almost at a 
and when 
system the day 
you 
of 
drugs and 
11 times. 
find out • 
the actual 
he was in 
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322 
1 question as to her competence as a witness to be able to 
2 testify about his whereabouts and how much she sees him and 
3 where he goes. 
4 THE COURT: Anything further, Mr. Bushell? 
5 MR. BUSHELL: Yes, Your Honor. Ms. Peterson did 
6 testify she went to work so obviously wasn't with him 24 
7 hours a day. The testimony by Mr. Tolman did nothing to 
8 impeach her that she didn't know he was using drugs. All it 
9 did, Your Honor, was shed a bad light on my client because of 
10 his drug use. 
11 THE COURT: Mr. Bushell, I'm going to deny the 
12 motion inasmuch as she did testify pretty unequivocally as I 
13 recall that she is not aware of any drug use. So it goes to 
14 whether or not she testified truthfully in that respect. 
15 Again, I instructed the jury only to consider it as rebuttal 
16 evidence. 
17 MR. BUSHELL: I would like my objection noted on 
18 the record. 
19 THE COURT: It is so noted, Mr. Bushell. 
20 MR. DECARIA: The State rests Your Honor. 
21 THE COURT: All right. Anything further gentlemen 
22 before we instruct the jury? 
23 MR. DECARIA: No, Your Honor. 
24 MR. BUSHELL: No, Your Honor. 
25 I THE COURT: Thank you. 
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BILLINGS, Presiding Judge 
*1 Khai Tran appeals his conviction for retail theft 
See Utah Code Ann § 76-6-602 (1999) We affirm 
Tran argues that the tual court erred by failing to 
grant a continuance under Utah Code section 
77-17-13 when the State did not comply with that 
section's notice requirements for expert witnesses 
See Utah Code Ann § 77- 17-13 (1999) 
Specifically, Tran argues that the jewelry store 
owner provided expert testimony regarding the 
diamond Tran was convicted of stealing If a party 
fails to meet the notification requirements of section 
77-17- 13(l)(a), "the opposing party shall be 
entitled to a continuance of the trial or hearing 
sufficient to allow preparation to meet the 
testimony " Id § 77-17-13(4)(a) 
A trial court's decision either to "grant or deny a 
continuance is clearly withm its discretion," and this 
court "will not disturb such decisions absent a clear 
abuse of discretion " State v Tolano, 2001 UT App 
37,1f 5, 19 P3d 400 (quotations and citation 
omitted) Moieover, we give the trial court 
considerable discretion in determining what 
constitutes expert testimony, and "[a]bsent a clear 
abuse of this discretion," the trial court will not be 
overturned State exrel G Y v State 962 P 2d 78, 
83 (Utah Ct App 1998) 
Prior to trial, Tran properly objected to the 
witness's ability to testify as an expert, but agreed 
that the witness could provide nonexpert testimony 
as the owner of the store However, at trial Tran did 
not object to any testimony of the owner as being 
expert testimony Thus, Tran did not present the 
trial court with an opportunity to rule upon whether 
any of the testimony was expert and thereby waived 
any objection See State v Holgate, 2000 UT 74,^| 
11, 10 P 3d 346 (statmg that "claims not laised 
before the trial court may not be raised on appeal") 
For this reason, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion either by failing to grant a continuance 
for Tran to prepare to meet expert testimony or by 
admitting the testimony as nonexpert testimony 
Even if the testimony was expert m nature and the 
objection had been preserved, however, admitting 
the evidence would have been harmless error The 
elements of retail theft aie (1) taking possession of 
store merchandise, (2) with the intention of 
retaining or depriving the owner of the 
merchandise, and (3) without paying the retail value 
of the merchandise See Utah Code Ann § 
76-6-602(1) If the retail value of the merchandise 
falls between $1000 00 and $5000 00, then the theft 
is a third-degiee felony See Utah Code Ann § 7 6-
6-412(l)(b)(i) (1999) 
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On appeal, Tran claims that the State did not 
establish the retail value of the diamond except 
through the store owner's "expert" testimony. [FN1] 
Yet there was ample nonexpert t estimony r egarding 
the retail value of the diamond: t here w as e vidence 
that the diamond actually sold for more than 
$1000.00 and a police officer testified as to the 
retail value without objection. Thus, even if the 
store owner's testimony had been expert in nature, 
ample other evidence established the value of the 
diamond, and therefore any error in admitting the 
testimony would have been harmless. 
FN1. Tran also argues that the retail value 
of the diamond should be offset by the 
value of the cubic zirconium with which 
Tran replaced the diamond. We disagree. 
The relevant value is "the value of the 
property" taken, Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-412(l)(b)(i) (1999) (emphasis 
added), not the net value of the exchange 
of property. 
*2 For these reasons, we affirm. 
WE CONCUR: PAMELA T. GREENWOOD and 
GREGORY K. ORME, Judges. 
Not Reported in P.3d, 2004 WL 2251016 (Utah 
App.), 2004 UT App 347 
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ORME, Judge: 
[^l Defendant Salvador Torres-Garcia appeals his conviction of 
one count of murder, a first degree felony. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-203 (2003) . He argues that the trial court erred by 
refusing to grant his motion for a continuance. We agree that 
the denial of the motion was erroneous, and we reverse 
Defendant's conviction and remand the case for a new trial. 
BACKGROUND 
%2 On September 23, 2003, Clara Irwin contacted a drug dealer 
and requested a delivery of cocaine to the hotel room in which 
she and her husband, Todd Irwin, were staying. During the 
delivery, the drug runner left several baggies of heroin in the 
Irwins' hotel room to avoid the potential discovery of the drugs 
by a police officer that the runner had seen in the area. Mr. 
Irwin later met the drug runner at a nearby gas station to return 
the heroin. But when the two could not agree upon the amount of 
cocaine Mr. Irwin should receive for the heroin's safe return, he 
retained the heroin and returned to the hotel room. Fifteen 
minutes after Mr. Irwin's return, several men entered the hotel 
room and, in the presence of Ms. Irwin, assaulted, shot, and 
killed him. 
%3 Ms. Irwin, sleep-deprived and having recently indulged her 
drug addiction, was interviewed by the police after the shooting. 
Because of her physical state, she would periodically "nod off" 
during this initial interview. Then, during subsequent 
interviews--one at the police station later that evening and 
another held several weeks later--many details recounted were 
inconsistent with her initial statement. So, although Ms. Irwin 
picked Defendant out of a photo array and identified him at a 
lineup, her testimony about who actually shot her husband was far 
from impenetrable because of her inconsistent interview 
responses. 
K4 Defendant was charged with murder and, in preparing his 
case, he filed discovery requests for identification of all 
expert witnesses that the State planned to use in prosecuting 
him. On April 15, 2004--almost two months after the preliminary 
hearing--the State filed a Notice of Expert Witnesses, stating 
its intention to use Craig Watson, the Assistant Chief 
Investigator for the District Attorney, as an expert witness to 
"testify concerning drug trafficking." The certificate of 
delivery attached to the notice, however, verified that it was 
mailed to an attorney other than the one representing Defendant. 
[^5 Apparently, then, the earliest that Defendant's trial 
counsel was actually made aware that the State planned to use 
Watson as an expert witness was during a hearing held Thursday, 
May 20, 2004--five days before the trial was set to commence. 
The following Monday, Defendant raised the lack of notice issue 
at a motion hearing. The trial court determined that the State 
had not complied with the notice requirements of Utah Code 
section 77-17-13 and determined that Defendant was entitled to a 
continuance. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(1), (4) (a) (2003) . 
Rather than see the trial continued, the State opted to go 
forward with the trial, expressly representing it would forgo the 
use of Watson as an expert witness. 
f6 The trial commenced the following day, Tuesday, May 25. 
That morning, the State filed a motion asking the trial court to 
reconsider its ruling regarding the State's use of Watson as an 
expert, arguing that he met the exception specified in subsection 
6 of the statute as recently amended.1 The trial court 
ultimately agreed with the State, which prompted Defendant to 
Subsection 6 was added to section 77-17-13 by an amendment 
that became effective on May 5, 2003. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-
17-13 amendment notes (2003). 
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again request a continuance, but this time the trial court denied 
the request. However, the court ordered that Watson could not 
testify until the second day of trial so that defense counsel 
would have an opportunity to interview Watson prior to his in-
court testimony. With this minimal limitation in place, the 
trial then proceeded as scheduled. 
i|7 During opening statements and during the examination of 
witnesses, defense counsel heavily emphasized the inconsistencies 
in Ms. Irwin's various accounts of the shooting. For example, 
her testimony varied regarding what Mr. Irwin requested--money or 
drugs--as payment for the heroin's return, who drove the car used 
in fleeing the crime, and the name of the shooter. Defense 
counsel especially highlighted these inconsistencies during the 
cross-examination of Ms. Irwin, which took place on the first day 
of trial and well before defense counsel had any opportunity to 
talk with Watson. 
[^8 On the second day of trial, the State called Watson as its 
final witness. Watson, as an expert witness regarding drug 
trafficking, was able to explain away many of the inconsistencies 
in Ms. Irwin's testimony--inconsistencies upon which the defense 
was so heavily relying to undermine her testimony. Watson 
testified that drug dealers often use monetary amounts to refer 
to quantities of drugs, that drug dealers usually have many cars 
and their runners do not consistently use the same cars, and that 
drug dealers use frequently changing nicknames in communicating 
with their customers. Watson's testimony provided compelling 
explanations for many of the apparent inconsistencies in Ms. 
Irwin's testimony. 
|^9 The jury returned a guilty verdict on May 28, 2004, and 
Defendant was later sentenced to prison. Defendant then filed 
this appeal. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
tlO Defendant argues that the trial court improperly denied his 
renewed motion for a continuance. "The decision to grant or deny 
a requested continuance lies within the broad discretion of the 
trial court, and we will not disturb such a decision absent a 
clear abuse of discretion." State v. Begishe, 937 P.2d 527, 530 
(Utah Ct. App. 1997). Accord State v. Cabututan, 861 P.2d 408, 
413 (Utah 1993). Further, it is necessary in establishing such 
an abuse of discretion to show that Defendant was prejudiced by 
the denial, since "[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or variance 
which does not affect the substantial rights of a party shall be 
disregarded." Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a). Thus, we will only 
reverse when our "review of the record persuades [us] that 
without the error there was a reasonable likelihood of a more 
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favorable result for the defendant." State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 
913, 919 (Utah 1987) (internal quotations, citations, and 
emphasis omitted). 
ANALYSIS 
Ull Utah Code section 77-17-13 governs the notice requirements 
applicable to expert testimony. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13 
(2003). Under this section, a party that intends to call an 
expert witness to testify at trial is generally required to give 
notice to the opposing party "not less than 30 days before 
trial." Id. § 77-17-13(1) (a). Such notice must include the 
expert's name, address, curriculum vitae, and either the expert's 
written report, a written explanation of the proposed testimony, 
or notice that the expert is available for consultation upon 
reasonable notice. See id. § 77-17-13(1)(b). When a party does 
not "substantially comply" with the notice requirements, the 
other party is "entitled to a continuance . . . sufficient to 
allow preparation to meet the testimony" if such continuance is 
"necessary to prevent substantial prejudice." Id. § 77-17-
13(4) (a) . 
^12 The State argues, however, that its use of Watson as an 
expert comes within an exception found in subsection 6--which 
applies to state employees used as expert witnesses--and, 
therefore, that only informal notice was required. See id. § 77-
17-13(6). Subsection 6 requires only that the opposing party be 
"on reasonable notice through general discovery that the expert 
may be called as a witness at trial, and the witness is made 
available to cooperatively consult with the opposing party upon 
reasonable notice." Id. The State contends, and the trial court 
concluded when this subsection was belatedly called to its 
attention, that the conditions for this less formal notice were 
met here. 
H13 The State's recast argument presents a "square peg in a 
round hole" dilemma. Despite its belated reliance on the 
"general discovery" exception of subsection 6, the State had 
actually attempted to give specific notice under subsection 1, 
providing Watson's name, address, and curriculum vitae.2 The 
2While the State was actually attempting to fulfill the more 
formal notice requirements of subsection 1, it is unclear whether 
this was because of the State's belief that subsection 1 was 
applicable, an abundance of caution on the State's part, or 
simply an unawareness of the newly added subsection 6. 
Notwithstanding the State's attempt to comply with the formal 
notice requirements of subsection 1, the trial court found the 
(continued...) 
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certificate of mailing, however, shows that the notice was not 
sent to Defendant's counsel, but rather to a different attorney 
at a different address. While the State contends that the notice 
was also sent to Defendant's counsel, and that it had a paralegal 
ready to testify to that effect, defense counsel maintained that 
he never received the notice. Thus, whether the notice was sent 
to Defendant's counsel or not, it appears that Defendant first 
actually learned of the State's intention to use Watson's expert 
testimony from a comment the State made during the hearing held 
five days before trial.3 
|^14 As concerns notice pursuant to subsection 6, it appears that 
the only "general discovery" the State can point to as meeting 
that subsection's "reasonable notice" requirement is the 
problematic Notice of Expert Witnesses that the State attempted 
to send to Defendant's counsel several weeks before trial. Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-17-3(6). Moreover, there is no indication Watson 
was ever "made available to cooperatively consult" with 
Defendant's counsel until the trial had started. Id. 
1[15 But whether the trial court was correct in holding that 
subsection 6 controlled is, ultimately, unimportant given the 
unique circumstances of this case, and we express no opinion on 
this determination. For regardless of whether subsection 6 
applied, the peculiar facts of the instant case still required 
the trial court to grant a continuance, and its failure to do so 
was an abuse of discretion. 
2(...continued) 
notice deficient under that subsection. It determined that some 
of the required information was revealed to the defense only a 
few days before trial and that such notice "does not give 
[Defendant] sufficient time to prepare." 
3The State, relying on a comment made by the trial court 
that "the State has in fact submitted notice of the expert 
testimony," argues that the trial court found that the notice had 
in fact been sent to Defendant's counsel. It appears, however, 
that this particular statement actually referenced the notice 
submitted to the court, which was submitted in a timely manner 
and thus indicates that the State was not acting in bad faith. 
But for purposes of notice to Defendant, the court focused on 
whether such notice was actually received. Highlighting defense 
counsel's contention that the notice was never received and the 
insufficient time he had to prepare to address Watson's testimony 
after its first mention five days before trial, the court noted: 
"If the defense is stating it on the record, I can only take in 
good faith their statements that they did not receive sufficient 
information as the rule requires to determine what this expert 
testimony is." 
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|^16 The essence of the trial court's error is that it initially 
ruled one way on the use of Watson as an expert witness, 
prompting an important concession by the State, and then reversed 
itself on the morning trial began. The trial court should have 
recognized that this "false start" lulled Defendant into a state 
of understandable complacency as concerns giving any pretrial 
attention to Watson's expert testimony. The court should have 
granted the renewed request for a continuance to ensure that the 
entire burden of the State's late assertion of its subsection 6 
argument--and the trial court's belated acceptance of the 
argument--did not fall on Defendant. 
Kl7 Thus, given the court's initial ruling that notice was 
insufficient and the State's agreement not to use Watson as an 
expert, the real problem here was that Defendant had no reason, 
in the key preparation days immediately before trial, to think 
Watson's expert testimony would be used at trial nor any motive 
to prepare to meet the testimony. "Clearly the statute's notice 
requirement contemplates that a party be able to adequately 
prepare to meet adverse expert testimony." State v. Arellano, 
964 P.2d 1167, 1170 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Rule 16 of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, which governs discovery, also 
contemplates such an opportunity for preparation. See Utah R. 
Crim. P. 16(a) (5) (requiring the State to disclose to the 
defendant any item of evidence needed "in order for the defendant 
to adequately prepare his defense"); Utah R. Crim. P. 16(g) 
(providing for the grant of a continuance when a party is not 
furnished the required evidence). When a trial court's pretrial 
ruling means that an expert witness will not testify and then, at 
the outset of trial, the court modifies its decision and allows 
the witness to testify as an expert, a continuance may well be 
required if requested. 
^18 We must determine if the circumstances here are such that a 
continuance was necessary. 
In reviewing the denial of appellant's 
request for continuance or other relief, we 
consider four factors: (1) the extent of 
appellant's diligence in his efforts to ready 
his defense prior to the date set for trial; 
(2) the likelihood that the need for a 
continuance could have been met if the 
continuance had been granted; (3) the extent 
to which granting the continuance would have 
inconvenienced the court and the opposing 
party; and (4) the extent to which the 
appellant might have suffered harm as a 
result of the court's denial. 
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State v. Begishe, 937 P.2d 527, 530 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) 
(emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). 
Kl9 As to the first factor, Defendant was diligent in his trial 
preparation. Prior to trial, Defendant objected to the testimony 
in question and would have been granted a continuance but for the 
State agreeing to forgo its use of Watson's expert testimony. 
Defendant had no reason to prepare to meet Watson's testimony 
because Defendant had every assurance such testimony would not be 
used. Cf. Arellano, 964 P.2d at 1171 (stating "it is not 
defendant's duty to anticipate and prepare for all potential, yet 
undisclosed, expert witnesses"). "Nor was the last minute 
development of this significant evidence something that 
[Defendant's] counsel could reasonably have anticipated." 
Begishe, 937 P.2d at 531. Indeed, Defendant's renewed request 
for a continuance and lack of pretrial preparation to meet 
Watson's testimony was ultimately caused by the State's last-
minute argument, raised the morning of trial, regarding the 
subsection 6 exception. 
[^2 0 Turning to the second factor, the continuance was needed to 
allow Defendant's counsel time to incorporate the additional 
adverse testimony into his trial strategy. "A continuance would 
have both provided [D]efendant more time to prepare to challenge 
[Watson's] testimony and allowed him to consult with his own 
expert and then incorporate any new information into the defense 
strategy." Arellano, 964 P.2d at 1171. Instead, Defendant's 
counsel was required to go forward with his opening statement and 
the cross-examination of several witnesses that very morning, 
using his previously developed trial strategy and largely 
focusing on the inconsistencies in Ms. Irwin's testimony. 
Although it is somewhat doubtful Defendant could have procured a 
witness to contradict the explanations about drug trafficking 
advanced by Watson, defense counsel still should have been 
allowed adequate time to prepare to meet the testimony in other 
ways--for example, by attacking Watson's qualifications or, more 
productively, reorganizing the defense strategy so it did not so 
greatly hinge on the apparent discrepancies in Ms. Irwin's 
testimony that were rather thoroughly explained away by Watson. 
^21 As to the third factor, of course a continuance is an 
inconvenience to the other participants in the trial. But "any 
inconvenience to the State caused by a continuance would have 
been fully justified" because, as discussed above, it was the 
State's last-minute argument that created the need for the 
continuance. Begishe, 937 P.2d at 530-31. And while "[t]he 
court and jury may have been inconvenienced to an extent, . . . 
[Defendant's] right to a fair trial outweighs this administrative 
concern." Id. at 531. 
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^22 With respect to the fourth factor, Defendant was 
sufficiently prejudiced by the denial of his second request 
for a continuance to warrant a new trial. Statements made by 
Defendant's counsel during opening statements--before counsel 
had any opportunity to- learn what Watson's expert testimony would 
be--were undercut by Watson's testimony, which counsel, before 
trial, had every reason to suppose would not be permitted. Under 
these circumstances, "[i]t is likely defense counsel's 
credibility in the eyes of the jury was greatly compromised by 
the prosecution's [introduction of Watson's expert testimony]." 
Id. 
f23 The court's initial ruling in favor of Defendant--that he 
would be allowed a continuance if Watson was to be used as an 
expert--followed by the court's reconsideration and reversal of 
its ruling on the first morning of trial, required a continuance. 
It was unreasonable for the court to deny Defendant's renewed 
continuance motion and, instead, order that Watson's proposed 
testimony be evaluated sometime during the evening of the first 
day of trial. "'The effective administration of justice requires 
that discoverable evidence be provided much sooner than "moments" 
before trial,' much less during the course of trial." Id. at 532 
(citation omitted). Such last-minute evaluation of expert 
testimony "precluded [Defendant] from formulating a trial 
strategy best calculated to address the totality of the State's 
case." Id. at 531. Under these circumstances, the district 
court "at a minimum was required to grant a continuance of 
reasonable duration," and its failure to do so was a clear abuse 
of discretion. Id. at 532.4 
4Defendant also argues that the trial court abused its 
discretion and violated rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
by admitting certain drug and weapon evidence. See Utah R. Evid. 
4 04 (b) . Given the outcome of our decision on the continuance 
issue, we need not evaluate the evidentiary question. But 
because this second issue is likely to be raised again upon 
remand, we will briefly address it here in the interest of 
judicial economy. See State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d 750, 755 (Utah 
1986) . 
The trial court found that the drug and weapon evidence at 
issue was "probative for the non-character purposes of proving 
identity, intent, plan, preparation and lack of accident"--all 
specific exceptions to the rule 404 prohibition against evidence 
of other bad acts. See Utah R. Evid. 404(b). We do not see any 
error in this determination. Nor can we say the evidence is 
irrelevant or unfairly prejudicial, especially considering the 
limited use made of the evidence and the limiting instruction 
given to the jury to that effect. See Utah R. Evid. 402 
("Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible."); Utah R. 
(continued...) 
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CONCLUSION 
1(24 The trial court abused its discretion by denying the request 
for a continuance after modifying its ruling on the morning of 
trial and admitting expert testimony that Defendant was 
previously assured would not be admitted. Thus, we reverse 
Defendant's conviction and remand for a new trial. 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
H25 WE CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, 
Presiding Judge 
James Z. Davis, Judge 
4(...continued) 
Evid. 403 (providing relevant evidence "may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice"). 
Further, although Defendant, in an attempt to avoid 
emphasizing the evidence to the jury, requested that a limiting 
instruction not be used, the judge's decision to include such an 
instruction was proper. "It is the duty of the judge to instruct 
the jury on relevant law. Accordingly, the judge may, over the 
objection of the defendant's counsel, give any instruction that 
is in proper form, states the law correctly, and does not 
prejudice the defendant." State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 428 
(Utah 1986). Such was the instruction here, and giving it was 
entirely appropriate. 
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1 foreperson must hold the verdicts until I instruct otherwise. 
2 You are the exclusive judges of the facts and the 
3 evidence. It is your duty to render a just verdict based 
4 upon the facts and the evidence. In determining any fact in 
5 this case you should not consider or be influenced by any 
6 statement made or any action taken by the Court that you may 
7 interpret as indicating the Court's view in this case. The 
8 Court has not intended to express or to give any opinion on 
9 what the proof shows or does not show or what are or what are 
10 not the facts in the case. You are the sole and final judges 
11 of all questions of fact submitted to you and you must 
12 determine such questions for yourselves from the evidence 
13 without regard to what you believe the Court thinks. 
14 At this time the Court will recognize counsel for 
15 closing arguments. 
16 Mr. Decaria, are you prepared? 
17 MR. DECARIA: I am, Your Honor. 
18 THE COURT: Mr. Bushell are you prepared? 
19 MR. BUSHELL: I am, Your Honor. 
20 THE COURT: Mr. Decaria, if you would proceed. 
21 MR. DECARIA: Thank you. 
22 Member of the jury, you are almost done on this 
23 very long day and it's probably been a little bit of a long 
24 trial for you. This is my opportunity to summarize what I 
25 believe the facts are that you're to deliberate on when you 
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1 go into the jury room. Before I do that I want to thank you 
2 for your attendance here today, your attention that you've 
3 given to this case. Jury service is what makes the criminal 
4 justice system work and without you, without people willing 
5 to serve, we would never be able to have an effective and 
6 workable system. So you play a role, a very important role 
7 and I want to thank you for it. 
8 You know, it's interesting, I told you when you 
9 were first here and I was making my opening statement that 
10 some of these people had fractured lives that were going to 
11 testify in front of you. They live on the edge and some of 
12 the stuff they do in their lives, you may not even be able to 
13 relate to but they're human beings and they were brought here 
14 to try and seek justice in this case, to help you find 
15 justice in this case. If we're going to have bad crimes it 
16 would be nice to be able to call witnesses that we really, 
17 really knew as prosecutors were going to be great witnesses 
18 with tons of credibility. I'll give you a good example. 
19 When I was kid going to elementary school, I went to St. 
20 Joseph's Elementary School which in the 60s was down on 
21 Lincoln on 28th Street in Ogden and I went to school down 
22 there and the nuns who taught us, they lived in a convent up 
23 on the top of Lake Street by Central High School and at that 
24 time these nuns wore black habits with the starched white 
25 bodice and a real tight starched thing around their heads and 
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1 this big halo, starched fabric and when we'd go to school in 
2 the morning by quarter to 8:00 in the morning when school 
3 started, they were always there, always in class, always 
4 ready to go. Well, one day they weren't there. They were 
5 late. I mean, that never happened. We were having kind of a 
6 gay old time in class because the nuns weren't there and then 
7 we found out what happened. As they were driving from the 
8 convent down to St. Joseph's Elementary School, they were six 
9 nuns riding in the car that they had at the time. It was a 
10 1963 blue Ford Galaxy 500 station wagon. I remember it very 
11 clearly and they were witness as they were driving down there 
12 to a very bad accident. They were witness to it and so they 
13 stopped, rendered aid and then to talk to police officers 
14 about what was going on. 
15 I always thought what a horrible feeling that must 
16 be for the driver that was at fault to know that there 
17 watching the accident were some of the most credible people 
18 in a community. That whole car load of nuns story, watching 
19 an incident really worked in that particular case. We used 
20 to laugh about that. How would you like to be that poor guy? 
21 We don't have that here today. As a matter of fact 
22 it's been said that crimes conceived in hell don't have 
23 angels as witnesses and that's what we have here. But 
24 nonetheless, the case has merit, credibility and indications, 
25 I indicia that warrant this case being here. 
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1 Now what I say is not evidence. What counsel says 
2 is not evidence. Neither he nor I were at the Ogden River 
3 Inn when this thing occurred. The defendant requested a jury 
4 trial. That's not evidence either the fact that he requested 
5 a jury trial. It cuts neither for or against his guilt or 
6 innocense but he has a right to it. Our constitution gives 
7 him that right to that jury trial and it's my obligation as 
8 the prosecutor of this county to guarantee that he gets it 
9 and gets it fairly and that's what my intention has been 
10 throughout this hearing. 
11 The defendant is charged with two crimes. He's 
12 charged with robbery, robbery in the same way that Ellis 
13 Ringwood and Terranosha Jackman were charged, the exact same 
14 crime, no worse, one that carries no more punishment, one 
15 that carries no less punishment than they. He's also 
16 charged, however, with the charge of assault because as 
17 you've heard the testimony, he's the one that struck this 
18 little man. 
19 I want to talk about some of the things that you're 
20 suppose to use as a guide for your deliberations today. One 
21 is, reasonable doubt. The judge has instructed you on 
22 reasonable doubt. The reasonable doubt is Instruction No. 
23 30. Sometimes you hear - it's used in the legal context 
24 sometimes and it bothers me when this is done. People say I 
25 know it's true beyond a shadow of a doubt or there's even a 
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1 book, I think, a novel written about some courtroom case that 
2 said beyond a shadow of a doubt. Beyond a shadow of a doubt 
3 is not the test that you're required to apply. Your test is 
4 reason. You use reason. You're the reasonable man that we 
5 talked about. You're the reasonable person that's been 
6 brought here to consider this case and you don't need to look 
7 for doubt. You don't need to search for doubt. If doubt 
8 doesn't exist, then don't find it and find the defendant 
9 guilty. You don't have to go in worrying about reasonable 
10 doubt. 
11 Number two, the issue of the (static). I just want 
12 to talk about that. First of all, if you recount one 
13 robbery, just for a minute, read this without putting Joseph 
14 Hoskins' name on the top and analyze it this way. On the 
15 date in question, the morning hours of August 17, 2004 was 
16 Mr. Leslie Dean Powell robbed? I'd submit to you that you 
17 have two people that were here that testified that yes in 
18 fact, not only was he robbed but they participated in it. 
19 They themselves are culpable for this robbery. So they 
20 themselves are guilty of unlawfully and intentionally 
21 attempting or taking by means of force or fear property in 
22 the possession of Mr. Powell or from his immediate person 
23 against his will and with the intent to defraud. Ellis 
24 Ringwood, Terranosha Jackman are guilty of that and they pled 
25 J guilty and they're taking their lumps right now, even as we 
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1 speak. So do we know that Leslie Powell, Leslie Dean Powell 
2 was robbed? Yes, it's a given. 
3 Let's go to the issue of the assault. Leslie Dean 
4 Powell's testimony was that he's five five, weighs between 
5 115 and 120 pounds. He's not a big man. He's a drunk. He 
6 frequents prostitutes. He lives in a flop house. He's got 
7 really no life that any of us here would want to have. He 
8 doesn't have a life like us. He doesn't own his own home, he 
9 doesn't really have the luxuries of life that we all take and 
10 consider (inaudible). He doesn't have that but is he less of 
11 an individual than you or I? Is he, because of his living 
12 conditions somehow does he deserve this kind of treatment? 
13 As a matter of fact, if we can't protect in this community 
14 the least of us, the least fortunate of us, the smallest of 
15 us, then we can't protect anybody and I submit to you that he 
16 didn't deserve the robbery and he didn't deserve this 
17 assault. He didn't deserve it, the damage to that ear, the 
18 tearing away of the ear from his head partly, the stitches, 
19 the 41 plus stitches that he testified about. He didn't 
20 deserve that. Was he assaulted in this robbery? I think 
21 when you go back to the jury room the question is absolutely 
22 yes. He was robbed and assaulted, no question about it. 
23 J He testified, Leslie Dean Powell, testified that 
24 I this happened on the morning of the 17th of August, that he 
25 J was sitting in his chair where he normally sits watching TV, 
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1 watching the news with his glasses on when a knock came at 
2 the door. He said that Terranosha Jackman, and she testified 
3 inconsistent with this, but Terranosha Jackman was at the 
4 door, he let her in, gave her some money, she used the phone 
5 and she left. He testified that a few minutes later, well, 
6 half hour or so later, quite a while later actually, up to an 
7 hour later, there was a knock at the door again and he looked 
8 out the window and standing right there he saw Terranosha 
9 Jackman. He got up, opened the door and it wasn't Terranosha 
10 Jackman alone. It was Terranosha Jackman with two other men 
11 and he said they were black men and he said she's a black 
12 woman, three black individuals, two of them men, came into 
13 that room that day. Do we have any reason to dispute what 
14 Mr. Powell said? Do we have any reason to dispute any of 
15 that? He said that one of them, the least heavy set one and 
16 the tallest of the black males sat on the bed across from his 
17 position where he was seated. The shorter stockier, you've 
18 seen them, the defendant is taller and thinner, Ellis 
19 Ringwood is shorter and stockier, the shorter and stockier 
20 one, sat right there. But there wasn't really much of a 
21 conversation going on, a few pleasantries and all of a sudden 
22 he is hit on the side of the head as hard as he's ever been 
23 hit. It knocked him here and the next thing you know, he's 
24 pulled and thrown onto the floor and in the process of 
25 J ripping the property out of his pockets, his pants are 
339 
1 basically pulled down,, and he is bleeding and he's hurt. He 
2 identified the pictures, etc. He identified the injuries to 
3 his head. You'll get to see these photographs when you go 
4 back to the jury room. 
5 Is there reason to doubt that, that description? 
6 What gain does he have to say there were two men and one 
7 woman? What does he have to gain by that? His testimony is 
8 entirely credible. He doesn't recognize the defendant. He 
9 doesn't even recognize Ellis Ringwood but he knows Terranosha 
10 Jackman for reasons that you obviously can imply. He spent 
11 time with her probably in ways that we don't want to think 
12 about here but he knows her so he could identify her. Okay. 
13 The arrest of these individuals did not take place 
14 on August 17th, the cops in hot pursuit, tracking down these 
15 thugs who'd done this. It took a while. It took a month to 
16 get Terranosha Jackman. Detective Gent and others did their 
17 investigative work and she was arrested. The morning she was 
18 arrested I think she said on like the 17th or 20th of ' 
19 September for this charge. When she was arrested what did 
20 she do? She lied. She was trying to get out of it. Was 
21 that credible for her to say that she lied when you're living 
22 that kind of an existence that she lied? Of course she lied. 
23 She said, of course I lied. I was trying to save my bacon so 
24 I didn't get hauled in and put in jail or prison or anything 
25 I else for this offense. Of course she lied but after a while 
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1 when the handwriting was on the wall, she told the truth. 
2 She told the truth here in court. She testified in front of 
3 you here in court about what her part in this was. What she 
4 said was that I was (inaudible) and I was trying to get money 
5 to buy drugs and I needed drugs and I'm a crack addict and 
6 all those bad things that her life entails, horrible things. 
7 She needed that stuff and anyway she could get money 
8 together, she would get it. She got money from him earlier, 
9 used it to buy drugs and then realized that he had more money 
10 and that they could money later from him. 
11 So she goes over to this address on 28th and 
12 Childs. And there she meets up with Ellis Ringwood and there 
13 she meets up with Joe Hoskins and people at that house are 
14 using crack-cocaine there and she says you know, I know where 
15 we can get some money, and she lied to Ellis Ringwood. She 
16 said, by Ellis Ringwood's testimony she said, she told me 
17 there was a John who hasn't paid her and we need to get the 
18 money from him to pay for the trick and I need some help, 
19 somebody to go over there and just be big and menacing so 
20 that we can get this money from him. You saw the size of 
21 him. Frankly, she could take him, she could lick Dean Powell 
22 herself. I don't think she wanted to take that chance. She 
23 | was high, very high. 
24 I There was a discussion at this address of 28th and 
25 I Childs where Ellis and she are talking about how to get that 
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1 money and Ramon and Joe say, well, we'll go. Ramon decided 
2 not to go and she said Joe went. They got in the car, Ellis 
3 was driving, defendant in the back seat, Terranosha in the 
4 front seat. They pull up on the north side of the hotel, 
5 park here - well, that's not where it's marked, but they 
6 parked there. They walk around. They hide so that Dean 
7 Powell can't see them. They hide by these stairs. You heard 
8 his testify when they hadn't looked at these pictures yet and 
9 there's (inaudible). They go to the door. She goes to the 
10 door, excuse me, the two men hide. She knocks on the door, 
11 Dean sees them, sees her, opens the door and then by that 
12 time after he opens the door, they've snuck back and they 
13 walk in right behind her and then the rest happens. Is there 
14 any reason to doubt that that occurred? There's no reason to 
15 doubt that that occurred. 
16 She testified that they were there for a short 
17 time. She fidgets and is nervous. She's all over the room 
18 and she hears a thud. She turns around and she looks and who 
19 is standing over the victim, Mr. Powell, but Joe Hoskins. 
20 | Joe Hoskins, right there. They're there for money. She saw 
21 the guy hit, she saw the blood. She saw it splattered on Joe 
22 Hoskins' feet. They were stepping in it. He was bleeding 
23 and she said that the wallet was removed from his pants, that 
i i 
24 Joe Hoskins removed it and Ellis Ringwood removed it. They 
25 j got in the car and fled. She took the phone so he wouldn't 
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1 call. She took his cell phone so he wouldn't call and she 
2 took a shirt so she could change her appearance out on the 
3 street in case somebody was chasing her and then, of course, 
4 they took the money. Her testimony was Ellis Ringwood 
5 divided up the money and they all got together and went back 
6 and smoked. 
7 There are discrepancies. I can't deny those 
8 discrepancies. You're talking about people who this happened 
9 quite a while ago, number one. But number two, you're 
10 talking about people that are high. You're talking about 
11 people that are stressed and you're talking about people who 
12 have done a very bad thing and there are differences. She 
13 remembers they stopped at the Maverick. Ellis does not. 
14 Ellis does not. But she does remember they went right back 
15 to the address on Childs and got high and smoked more crack. 
16 She's fractured, the testimony is fractured but is 
17 it unbelievable? I submit to you, no because when you talk 
18 about Terranosha Jackman, she's in jail, she's doing time and 
19 she's here testifying about somebody else who is likely to do 
20 time who might even be in the same facility. Is that a safe 
21 thing to do? Have you ever heard about the concept of an 
22 inmate whose ratted on somebody else wearing a snitch jacket 
23 and being in some sort of peril? (inaudible). She's not 
24 without credibility in my view and here's the question and it 
25 I applies to everybody who has testified, why in the heck would 
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1 she want to frame up Joe Hoskins? You know, she didn't have 
2 to testify against anybody. She didn't have to rat on Joe 
3 Hoskins. She didn't have to say anything about anybody. Why 
4 Joe Hoskins? Is he just the (inaudible) chump that she 
5 picked on? 
6 Independently of that, Ellis Ringwood testified and 
7 Ellis Ringwood talked to the police independently of 
8 anything. They weren't arrested together and come up with a 
9 story to frame Joe Hoskins. They were arrested 
10 independently. Ellis Ringwood was arrested on October 1st 
11 and he lied, "I wasn't there, I didn't do it," whatever and 
12 before you knew it, he's coming clean with the goods too. 
13 Independently what did he say? He said, me, Terranosha and 
14 Joe Hoskins robbed this little man. 
15 Terranosha said that when she heard the thud, Ellis 
16 Ringwood was sitting down in this chair. Maybe she might 
17 actually have said this chair but even so he was sitting with 
18 a startled look on his face because he couldn't believe that 
19 somebody would strike that little man after their discussion 
20 about not using violence. 
21 And Ellis Ringwood said the same thing, "I was 
22 sitting in the chair, Joe Hoskins hauled off and hit that guy 
23 and I was stunned but we were there to do business. We were 
24 there to get that money and let's get the money and go," and 
25 | that's what they did and they left from there. 
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1 I'm telling you, there's a ring of truth to what 
2 Terranosha says and there's a ring of truth to what Ellis 
3 Ringwood says. Why in the heck would they want to frame up 
4 independently of each other, Joe Hoskins? Why would they do 
5 that? When they started telling the story with all of it's 
6 variations before it got to court and after it got to court, 
7 they never waived on who was involved in the crime. Ellis 
8 tried to cover up his culpability by denying it and then at 
9 the preliminary hearing saying, "Well, I didn't grab the 
10 wallet, that was Joe Hoskins, he did all of that." Today he 
11 says, I can't lie any more, I grabbed the wallet. I divvied 
12 up the money. I'm the bad guy. Terranosha, same thing, 
13 tried to lie but ultimately she's testified at the 
14 preliminary hearing and again here today very consistently 
15 with the facts in this case and the facts remembered by Mr. 
16 Powell. 
17 So now when you discuss the question about robbery, 
18 you can insert Joe Hoskins' name there and why in the heck 
19 would they want to frame him up? 
20 In the defense's case, they've called an alibi 
21 witness and she testified today that she doesn't have any 
22 reason to lie. I submit to you that she does. She is the 
23 working person in this family and she's raising this daughter 
24 that's both she and Joe's by herself and how difficult it 
25 J must be to be facing the prospect of raising a daughter on 
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1 your own with no means of any financial support other than 
2 the money you can make and possibly money that you might get 
3 from State help or some sort of help without the prospect of 
4 Joe Hoskins being a bread winner and paying child support. 
5 She has a reason. Consider that as part of the future that 
6 she has in trying to bring that child up and I don't envy her 
7 in that prospect. 
8 Number two, how difficult would it be for her to 
9 keep telling her daughter that your father is incarcerated in 
10 the state penitentiary or something like that or that he's 
11 been convicted of robbery? How hard would that be to have a 
12 I little girl that knows that? I submit she's got ample reason 
13 to try and protect this defendant even if they're not 
14 married, even if they're not living together, even if she has 
15 some reason to (inaudible). When she was talked to by 
16 Detective Gent, she didn't know what day of the week the 16th 
17 or 17th of August was. She didn't know what it was here. 
18 She just knows that he's with her all the time and couldn't 
19 have done this. But she didn't know that Joe was using 
20 drugs. She didn't know that. She testified absolutely not, 
21 conclusively sure that he wasn't using drugs when, in fact, 
22 he was. That goes to impeachment. How much did she really 
23 observe, how much did she really know? I submit to you that 
24 her testimony is extremely questionable. That alibi just 
25 plain does not work. 
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1 Joe Hoskins, let's say he was this guy, the robber, 
2 he's not employed. She testified he's not employed. If he's 
3 going to buy drugs, where is he going to get the money? Is 
4 he going to get it off the meager salary that she has from 
5 Wal-Mart to do it? He may just very well have to rob 
6 somebody to have the money to support a habit. 
7 I submit to you that when you go to the jury room 
8 today that when you hold this case up to the cruel light of 
9 day and you let the rays of the sun shine through, you will 
10 find Joe Hoskins guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
11 Now, that's the end of my closing statement but I 
12 will say this. The defendant has a right and the defense 
13 attorney is going to get up and he's going to make a closing 
14 statement and he's going to poke holes in things that I say. 
15 That's the way the game works. It's not really a game, I 
16 shouldn't use that word but that's the way the system works. 
17 And after he's done that, I have the right to stand up again 
18 and poke holes in what he says. The system provides the 
19 prosecution on whose burden it is to prove the case to have 
20 the final say so I'll take to you again. 
21 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Decaria. 
22 Mr. Bushell? 
23 MR. BUSHELL: Thank you, Your Honor. 
24 Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, thank you for 
25 J sitting through almost two full days of this trial. To begin 
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1 with, what happened to Mr. Powell is a tragedy and should 
2 never happen to anyone whatsoever, no matter what 
3 socioeconomic group you live in, whether you're living up 
4 here on the hill here in Ogden or down in the hood as Mr. 
5 Ringwood calls it. No one should have that happen to them. 
6 Mr. Powell has a right to live his life as he sees fit 
7 without fear of getting accosted in his own, at that time it 
8 was his home and we don't deny that he has that right and 
9 that that shouldn't have happened to him. However, my client 
10 should not be charged for what happened to Mr. Powell because 
11 he was not there. 
12 What I want to do is just break down some of the 
13 testimony that was given to begin with. I'm not quite a 
14 eloquent at Mr. Decaria but I will try my best. You first 
15 heard from Detective or Officer Beck. Officer Beck got on 
16 the stand, testified that his report states that the victim 
17 in this case, Mr. Powell would not be able to testify - I'm 
18 sorry, would not be able to identify the two black males if 
19 he ever saw them again. When Leslie Powell got on the stand 
20 he testified that he had the opportunity to see these two 
21 black males as they walked through this door first, followed 
22 him over here and sat directly across the table from him and 
23 directly from the bed to him. This isn't a very far 
24 distance. You can see in the pictures it's no further than 
25 j here to you and I. The light here in the lamp was on. The 
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1 TV was on, casting a shine. He could not identify either of 
2 the two assailants. 
3 Mr. Powell's testimony was the night before the 
4 incident he was too drunk to drive. He sat home all night 
5 drinking some Old Milwaukee and some Coors and went to bed. 
6 He stated he was alone that entire night. Ms. Jackman gets 
7 on the stand and says, no, I went over at seven and had some 
8 pizza. Mr. Powell told us that he'd never hired Ms. Jackman 
9 before for her services as a prostitute. It came out that, 
10 yes, he had whether it's oral sex or sexual intercourse, it 
11 doesn't really matter, the fact that he wasn't up front and 
12 honest in the beginning. He testified he gave Ms. Jackman 
13 $20 for bus fare. I don't know what bus she catching at that 
14 time of night but he gave her $20 for bus fare. Ms. Jackman 
15 says, no, he gave me money for drugs and knew that I was 
16 doing drugs. 
17 His recollection of who came first into the 
18 apartment was vastly different from what Ms. Jackman and Mr. 
19 Ringwood explained to us. He states that the two black 
20 individuals were here and came through first. The other 
21 testimony from the other two who were there who admit to 
22 being there was that Terranosha came in first followed by Mr. 
23 Ringwood. 
24 While it is true that two people were there, let's 
25 J take a look at those two people. Both admitted drug users, 
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1 living pretty much on the street, Ms. Jackman was a 
2 prostitute, been high and up for 24 hours. All she can focus 
3 on is where she's going to get her next hit, where she can 
4 buy some dope and how she could get the money to do so. She 
5 testified when she's been up for a while and been smoking 
6 dope, her memory is not that good. Mr. Ringwood testified 
7 that he'd been up for numerous days, high the entire time, 
8 bragged about the fact that he has money and he likes to have 
9 a get high party and that he loses his sense of time when 
10 he's high. He didn't say he loses his sense of anything else 
11 but you've got to take that into consideration when you 
12 deliberate on this case that he testified he'd been up for 
13 days on a crack-cocaine high. 
14 Ms. Jackman and Mr. Ringwood had vastly different 
15 stories of what happened, how they got to together. They 
16 both testified that they lied to the police officers. They 
17 made no bones about it. Prosecution hasn't tried to gloss 
18 over that fact at all but they lied to police officers 
19 numerous times. Mr. Ringwood not only lied to a police 
20 officer but he lied under oath at a preliminary hearing where 
21 he was sworn and put under oath to tell the truth. They 
22 lied. He lied under oath. What makes us think that they're 
23 under oath today and yesterday and not lying also? I submit 
24 I they lied because they were both originally charged with 
25 aggravated robbery and to (inaudible) their testimony, 
350 
1 testified against my client who cannot be identified at all 
2 by the victim, they were given a better deal. They sat up 
3 here, Ms. Jackman did, and answered my question, do you want 
4 to be here? No. Why are you here? Because she had to be 
5 here. It was part of her plea negotiation to testify against 
6 my client. 
7 True, both of them say my client was here, whether 
8 he sat here, stood here, they both say that he was there. 
9 There's no doubt about it. Again, take into account their 
10 mental state at the time, days on crack-cocaine. Hopefully 
11 none of us have had treble days high on crack-cocaine. Take 
12 also in account, let's consider this, that they both were a 
13 little iffy on how well they knew my client. They saw him a 
14 couple of times on the street, they may have been at this 
15 party on Childs. Guess who they did know very well? They 
16 knew Ramon, Ramon Krispen I believe is the name Ms. Jackman 
17 said. They knew him pretty well. They went to his house on 
18 occasion. Mr. Ringwood numerous occasions to smoke crack-
19 cocaine. The physical description of Ramon is that he was 
20 taller, the same description given by the victim in this 
21 case, that he was taller than Mr. Ringwood, slighter built. 
22 Mr. Ringwood is a big man. I would be scared of Mr. 
23 Ringwood. Could it be possible that it was Ramon that went 
24 there, to protect a friend whose house they go to, whose 
25 J house they used and know they can use to smoke their dope? I 
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1 suggest to you that it's very possible that could have 
2 happened is that Ms. Jackman, Mr. Ringwood knew each other 
3 very well, that they're protecting their friend who they can 
4 go smoke with and know that it's a safe place. They even 
5 testified they don't know my client very well. What better 
6 way to protect their crack house and the owner of that house 
7 than to send up my client? 
8 The prosecution wants to more or less bifurcate the 
9 testimony of Ms. Jackman and Mr. Ringwood using parts of 
10 each. Well, two wrongs don't make a right here. They didn't 
11 mention anything about the story Ms. Jackman gave us about 
12 making the call, Ellis is already there, they got in the car, 
13 they drove back. Didn't say anything about that. She 
14 contradicted to Ellis Ringwood saying, I was already on 
15 Childs Street with Joe and with Ramon. He's taking bits and 
16 pieces of two different stories of very high individuals, 
17 guys out and girls out looking to score more dope, taking 
18 bits and pieces of their stories to form what happened in 
19 this motel room. In one version of the story, who sits here? 
20 We don't know. Another version, who sits here? Another 
21 version, my client is sitting here. Another version, he's 
22 standing here. In one version Ms. Jackman is standing here 
23 I and in two other versions she's all over the place looking 
24 through clothes. We don't know what's right. You can't pick 
25 J and choose different parts of different stories to make one 
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1 whole story. 
2 The defense has presented evidence today through 
3 Ms. Peterson that my client, Joseph Hoskins, was with her. 
4 That hasn't been refuted. The prosecution would like you to 
5 think that because they have a baby together that she has the 
6 responsibility for raising that child. Yes, she does. I 
7 asked her point blank, would you lie for him? No, she 
8 wouldn't. They're in a relationship together that wasn't 
9 going well. They split up. Mr. Hoskins has been 
10 incarcerated for the past couple of months, no child support. 
11 The fact that they're not married and they have a child isn't 
12 enough to discredit her testimony. 
13 The prosecution wants you to remember that in March 
14 when called by Detective Gent, my client couldn't remember 
15 what day it was, what day of the week it was on the 16th or 
16 17th of August. I asked Detective Gent what day of the week 
17 it was when he called Danielle. He didn't remember. There's 
18 a map right there to go with that, still didn't remember. I 
19 submit that the fact alone that Ms. Peterson can't remember 
20 the day of the week months ago isn't enough to discredit her 
21 testimony that Joseph Hoskins was in bed with her on the 16th 
22 through the 17th, woke up at nine or ten in the morning that 
23 day. It's just not enough. 
24 The fact of the matter in this case is that we've 
25 I got too many holes in these stories. As Mr. Decaria informed 
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1 you, the State has the burden here, beyond a reasonable 
2 doubt. I submit to you that reasonable doubt exists here. 
3 There's too many flaws, there's too many stories. Granted, 
4 my client is not the best person in the world. Does he have 
5 a past? Yes. Did he do this? No. Thank you. 
6 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Bushell. 
7 Mr. Decaria? 
8 MR. DECARIA: I'll be as brief as I possibly can. 
9 Counsel's first line to you as jurors was the defendant was 
10 not there. Counsel can't say it so plainly as that because 
11 counsel wasn't there, he didn't see who was there. He wants 
12 you to glean from the evidence that the defendant was not 
13 there. He can't say with any degree of certainty himself 
14 that the defendant was not there. 
15 I want to thank counsel for saying that I'm 
16 eloquent but I thought you were just as eloquent as I was and 
17 I appreciate the hard work you've put into this case. 
18 Leslie Powell said he wouldn't be able to identify 
19 those guys and he didn't identify them. He didn't identify 
20 them in court and he said to the cop on the day he was 
21 investigated, I just won't be able to identity them but he 
22 knew Terranosha. He could say some things about them. They 
23 were black men, one taller than the other and one thinner and 
24 taller than the other one. Ellis Ringwood, the defendant, 
25 J fits that description at least. 
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1 Now Powell didn't say, Leslie Powell didn't say 
2 originally that he had sex with Terranosha. I think he was 
3 embarrassed. People who are embarrassed say things like that 
4 but does that mean he wasn't robbed? Does that mean he 
5 wasn't struck? Absolutely not. He was. Of course he was. 
6 I want to make this point. Differences in 
7 observations of certain occurrences when under stress don't 
8 detract necessarily from the credibility of the story, they 
9 enhance it because every witness to the same event sees 
10 things differently and so is it destructive of the entire 
11 scenario as described by these witnesses that Terranosha 
12 walked in and then fritted around here, doesn't know for sure 
13 whether or not or testified that Ellis Ringwood was sitting 
14 here rather than here or another witness said here or here? 
15 Is it destructive of the credibility of the story that Ellis 
16 Ringwood says that the defendant went and stood right by the 
17 guy when Leslie Powell says that he sat on the bed? Is that 
18 destructive? No. In my view, those are the kinds of 
19 differences that actually enhance the credibility of this 
20 story, of this case because if they were exact, exact, exact, 
21 they'd be rehearsed. In my view, that changes the 
22 credibility of the truth of the case. 
23 These witnesses are fractured. They live fractured 
24 lives. They were high. They were high for hours. Ellis 
25 Ringwood and Terranosha lied but I'll tell you what, what 
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1 reason does she have to lie to frame Joe Hoskins? What 
2 reason does she have to lie to frame Joe Hoskins? What 
3 reason does Ellis Ringwood have to lie to frame Joe Hoskins? 
4 Absolutely none. They've taken the fall on the exact same 
5 crime Joe Hoskins is charged with. There is no reason. 
6 Everything that the defendant says about Ramon is 
7 speculation and he's asking you to speculate that this was 
8 done to protect Ramon. These two witnesses Terranosha and 
9 Ellis Ringwood independently named Joe Hoskins in the 
10 investigation. The name of Ramon never came up until counsel 
11 brought it up today. 
12 Counsel says you can't pick and choose which one of 
13 these stories is credible. You can pick and choose. That's 
14 your job to pick and choose and you can look at the whole 
15 thing and say, they're consistent enough with each other and 
16 inconsistent enough with each other to have the ring of 
17 truth. 
18 I submit to you when you go back to the jury room 
19 today, you'll find that ring of truth in this case and you'll 
20 come back and you'll convict Joe Hoskins of robbery and 
21 assault. Thank you. 
22 THE COURT: Thank you, gentlemen. 
23 Members of the jury, you've now heard closing 
24 arguments in this matter. We are going to swear the bailiff 
25 in to take charge of you as you begin your deliberations. 
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1. 
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 
Keep in mind the following points: 
• Many Instructions. There will be many instructions. All are equally 
important. Don't pick out one and ignore the rest. Think about each 
instruction in the context of all the others. 
• Order. The order in which the instructions are given has no significance 
as to their relative importance. 
• Repetition. If an instruction is stated more than once, or in varying ways, 
no emphasis is intended, and none must be inferred by you. 
• Gender; Singular/Plural. In these instructions, the masculine gender, 
such as "he" or "him," includes the feminine "she" or "her," and the 
singular, such as "Defendant," includes the plural "Defendants" when 
appropriate. 
• Headings. Section headings are for convenience only and are not to be 
considered in construing or interpreting these instructions. 
2. 
THE GENERAL ROLE OF THE JUDGE, THE JURY AND THE 
LAWYERS 
The judge, the jury and the lawyers all play important roles in the trial. 
• Judge. It is my role as judge to decide all legal issues, supervise the trial 
and instruct the jury on the LAW that it must apply. 
Preliminary Jury Instructions 
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• Jury. It is your role as the jury to follow that law and decide the factual 
issues in this case. Factual issues generally relate to who. what, wiuv, 
where, how or similar thinjzs oir-vivino - ' -h c^-;de^ce w :n be presented. 
• Lawyers. It is the role of the lawyers to present evidence, genen. 
calling and questioning witnesses • •/ .*•• "'^rting exhibits. Each lawyer 
v v ill also try to persuade you to accept his version of the facts and to 
decide the case in favor of his client. 
3. 
OUTIiNKC)!"1'!!!!^!'! '"'I, J 
The trial will generally proceed as follows: 
• Opening Statements. At the beginning of the the l.iwy^ 
outline what ' - ^ .'U-M -ind lV h'e-" - "hat they think the evidence 
• Presentation of KVKSUK- '*••*•. __:. jvuencc in^t, lollowed 
by the Defendant. The Defendant, however, is not obliged to introduce any 
evidence or to call any witnesses. Each side may also offer rebuttal 
evidence after hearing the witnesses and seeing the exhibits offered by the 
other side. 
• Instructions on the Law. After the evidence has been presented, I will 
give you supplementary instructions on the law you are to apph in 
reaching your verdict. 
• Closing Arguments. Following my instructions to y-w i>n the law. 
lawyers may then summarize and argue the ;i<e. They Til b.are with ;. •; 
their respective views of the evidence, how it relates to the law and how 
they think you should decide the case. 
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• Jury Deliberation. After the evidence has been heard and arguments and 
instructions are concluded, you will retire to consider the evidence and 
arrive at your verdict. 
Neither the lawyers nor I actually decide the case. That is your role. Don't be influenced 
by what you think our personal opinions are; rather, decide the case based upon the law 
explained in these instructions and the evidence presented in court. 
4. 
CONFERENCES 
During the trial, I may confer with the lawyers out of your hearing on matters of law or 
procedure. I will try to limit these interruptions as much as possible, but since they are necessary 
for the orderly and fair disposition of this case, I ask you to please be patient even though things 
may seem to go slowly at times. 
5. 
THE CHARGE AND THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE 
The State has charged the Defendant, Joseph Hoskins, with the following crimes: 
robbery, and assault. 
The accusing document is called an "information." The information is an accusation only 
and not proof of guilt. It is also not evidence that Defendant committed any crime. 
The Defendant has entered a plea of "not guilty" to the information. The State, therefore, 
has the burden of proving each of the essential elements of the charge beyond a reasonable 
doubt. These elements will be explained to you later in the trial. 
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WIi uJRY'S HULL IN THIS CASE? 
h i>.- -• * . .^ >p. •^iOmt\ LO acciuc wneincr Uic State has proved the charge against 
tne 1 defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. Your decision is called a "verdict." Your verdict must 
be based solely on the evidence, or lack of evidence, and the law. It must be based on facts, not 
on speculation. 
1. 
WHAT IS EVIDENCE? • 
Evidence ^ anything that tends to prove or disprove the existence of a disputed fact. It 
can be testimony, documents, objects, photographs, stipulations, certain qualified opinions, or 
any combination of these things. Sometimes the lawyers may agree that certain facts exist. Y on 
should accept any agreed or stipulated facts as having been proved. 
Some evidence is admitted for a limited purpose only. When I instruct you that an item of 
evidence has been admitted for a limited purpose, you must cor^ul^r *' lv i ih.il limil' "I 
purpose and for no other. 
In limited instances, I may take "judicial notice" of a we!1 h \.w-> ^ • ^ • :,appens. I 
will explain how you should treat it. 
\ M , .; , .MIAL EVIDENCE 
. ._ ; J , , ... mib ^a^e . >.
 sj "\ .•-"-•J :.A^\ ..; circumstantial evidence. Direct 
evidence means exactly what the name implies, that is, it is evidence which directly proves a fact 
without having to infer that fact from some other fact. Circumstantial evidence, on the other 
hand, is evidence which proves a fact from which you may infer another fact. For example, if 
you must decide whether or not someone ate the cherry pie, testimony r\ .. witness ::,at N* <aw 
the person put the pie in his mouth and eat it WMIJU i>* i^V.-^  ^\;dence. However, if a witness 
testifies that he ar';^- : : r ,:i *r only to see the person standing there with the empty pie tin 
in his hand and cherry pie on ins face, that would be circumstantial evidence. Facts may be 
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proven by either type of evidence or any combination of them. Direct and circumstantial 
evidence are each accepted as a reasonable method of proof, and each is respected for such 
convincing force as it may carry. 
9. 
WHAT IS NOT EVIDENCE? 
I've explained to you what evidence is. Now I'll tell you about some things that are not 
evidence and that should not be considered in reaching your verdict. 
• Accusation. The fact that formal charges have been filed accusing the 
Defendant of committing a crime is not evidence of guilt. 
• 
• 
• 
Lawyer Statements. What the lawyers say is not evidence. Their purpose 
is to give you a preview of expected evidence and to help you understand 
the evidence from their viewpoint. 
Personal Investigation. Evidence is not what you can find out on your 
own. You should not make any investigation about the facts in this case. 
Do not make personal inspections, observations or experiments. Do not 
view premises, things or articles not produced in court. Don't let anyone 
else do anything like this for you. Don't look for information in law 
books, dictionaries or public or private records that are not produced in 
court. 
Out of Court Information. Anything you may have seen or heard outside 
the courtroom is not evidence, and must not be considered. You must rely 
solely on the evidence that is produced and received in court. 
Disregarded Evidence. Any evidence as to which I sustain an objection, 
and any evidence I order to be stricken, must be disregarded entirely. 
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Ml 
*xxE JUDGE DFriDFS Y II " I 1« VIIH'Ni in i» AUJ i 
Sometimes a question will he raided abwjt whoihci ecru: • ^icuce is proper for the jury 
to consider. This type o; que >n is called an OBJECTION. I rule on objections. If an objection 
is SUSTAINED, the evidence is kept out and you should not consider it. If an objection is 
OVERRULED, the evidence comes in and you may consider it. If evidence is STRICKEN, you 
should ignore it. 
You should not infer or conclude from any ruling or other comment I may make that I 
have any opinion on the merits of the case favoring one side or the other. And :i 1 sustain an 
objection to a question that goes unanswered by the witness . - :nr* -^v inference 
or conclusion from the questio: 'Kelf 
1 1 
N O T E ' . „ ™ _ 
You may take notes during the trial, but don't over do it, and don't let it distract you from 
following the evidence. The lawyers will review important evidence in their closing argument; 
and help you focus on that which is most relevant 10 \ *-ar decM- - l also caution that notes are 
not evidence. Use them v .*v .^d ; . ^ " p , i l memory or concentration, and don't attach undue 
in.pori:^ ' * }" ^ u-11 — * w \vri':en down. 
12. 
OPENING STATEMENTS 
Now, we will begin by giving the lawyers for each side an opportunity lo make ihcir 
opening statements, in which they may explain the issues >ri- »*> - . .:se and summarize the facts 
they expect the evidence will show. These statements are i mended to help you understand the 
issues and the evidence as it comes in, as well as the positions taken by both sides. I ask that you 
now give the lawyers your close attention. 
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0-8 
OPENING STATEMENTS BY COUNSEL 
OF. 9 
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HOW TO MAKE DECISIONS ABOUT THE EVIDENCE 
In their opening statements, the lawyers have told you what they expect the evidence will 
show. Once evidence is admitted, you must decide three things about :* K^ ' • ' ' u * 
believed, how important it is, and what \ -: - ;m :>.f.*i- Uu]t> r — ; 
Use your common sense in making these decisions. Review ^ . ;,ikj ia.ily 
without any bias or sympathy 'award either side. ' --•* permitted to draw, from the facts that 
you find have been proved. * reasonable inferences as you feel are justified in light of your 
experience, but don't imagine tilings that have no evidence to back them up. 
. • 14. 
^ x X I D I N G W H E T H E R TO RF 1,11'\ I < « < "II P i^ «> 
You are the exclusive judges of the credibi!;'\
 :,r -"•• • -•
 :
^esses . . he-
evidence. 
As each witness testifies, you must decid? h. \ • . • : • * * - i i : . : .^ip to 
ask yourself questions ,n, ^ • 
• Knowledge and Men;v,;*\ Jia * '"v>> . u4ui\ VJC. near or otherwise 
rvrc-;i\ • • 'hings described? 
• Memon. \Y:N !ht^  witne^ ;ihlp m i ih il1 n i ill illic things seen, heard 
or perccif * '? 
• Description Was the witness ...'ULCJ) describe the things 
recalled !^ r i i that you could understand? 
• i. ,,<*-,;.>», ..-i.-.-.N make conflicting statements or contradict 
other e\ icenee.' 
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• Reasonableness. Is the testimony reasonable in light of human 
experience? 
• Demeanor. What impression is made by the witness' appearance and 
conduct while answering questions? 
• Personal Interest. Does the witness have a personal interest in the 
outcome of the trial? 
• Bias. Does the witness have some bias or other motive to testify a certain 
way? 
You are not required to believe all that a witness says. You are entitled to believe one 
witness as against many or many as against one, in accordance with your honest convictions. 
15. 
WHAT IF A WITNESS GIVES FALSE OR INCONSISTENT 
TESTIMONY? 
If you believe a witness has purposely given false testimony about anything relevant to 
the case, you may disregard not only the false testimony but the remaining testimony from that 
witness, unless it is corroborated by other evidence; in which event you should give it what 
weight you think it deserves. 
You may believe that a witness, on some former occasion, made statements inconsistent 
with that witness' testimony given here in this case. 
That does not necessarily mean that you are required to disregard the present testimony 
entirely. The effect of such evidence upon the credibility of the witness is for you to determine. 
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OPINlif IIYi UNY 
Under certain circumstances, witnesses are am-na. 10 express an opinion. A person who, 
by education, study or experience, has become an expert in any art, science or profession, may 
give his opinion and the reason for it. A layman (or non-expert) is also allowed to express an 
opinion if it is based on personal observations and helpful to understanding his testimony. 
However, you are not bound to believe anyone's opinion. Consider an opinion as you \ ,'< uld nn / 
other evidence, and give it the weight you tu:rV lf c}c^w^< 
i™ FENDANT ESTIMONY 
, iic Defendant may or may not testify during the trial. The law expressly gives him the 
privilege of not testifying if he so desires. At no time is a Defendant in a criminal case required 
to prove his innocence or furnish any evidence whatsoever. The decision to testify or not testily 
is his alone to make, and the -*\ ' ' ^ infer <m:1t innocence from the 
Defend t- t's i]t^ M<i«Mi 
18. 
LOCATION 
Since this case involves an incident that occurred at a particular location, you :r;u> 
tempted to visit the scene yourself. Please do not do so. In \ie\v of the time that elapses before a 
case comes to trial, substantial changes may have oivirreJ at *h location after the event that 
gives rise to this actio* *. n i-o • - making an unguided visit without the benefit of explanation, 
you might get erroneous impressions. Therefore, even if you happen to live near the location, 
please avoid going to it or near it until the case is over. 
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19. 
QUESTIONS BY THE JUDGE DURING THE TRIAL 
During the course of a trial, I may occasionally ask questions of a witness in order to 
bring out facts not then fully covered in the testimony. Do not assume that I hold any opinion on 
the matters to which my questions may have related. Remember that you, as jurors, are at liberty 
to disregard all comments of the court in arriving at your own findings as to the facts. 
20. 
WHAT RULES APPLY TO RECESSES 
From time to time I will call for a recess. It may be for a few minutes, a lunch break, 
overnight, or longer. You will not be required to remain together while we are in recess. During 
recesses, DO NOT TALK ABOUT THIS CASE WITH ANYONE: NOT FAMILY, NOT 
FRIENDS AND NOT EVEN EACH OTHER. The Clerk may ask you to wear a badge 
identifying yourself as a juror so that people will not try to discuss the case with you. Don't 
mingle with the lawyers, the parties, the witnesses or anyone else connected with the case. You 
must let me know immediately if anyone discuss the case in your presence, despite your telling 
them not to. 
You may say "hello," or exchange similar greetings or civilities with these persons, but 
don't engage in conversations. Don't accept from or give to any of these persons any favors, 
however slight, such as rides or food. Finally, don't read about this case in the newspaper or 
listen to any reports on television or radio, and don't do any research or make any investigation 
about the case on your own. 
21. 
PRESENTATION OF THE EVIDENCE 
Please be alert and attentive during the presentation of the evidence. Don't form an 
opinion about the issues in this case until you have heard all the evidence and the lawyers' 
arguments and summaries. Keep an open mind until then. 
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HR3 
After the evidence has been presented, . ... , ^ ^
 ; ^idur- . inbiraaions on the 
applicable law and the \\ •M'gh,,^  of *^'dir!ce to assist} ou in arriving at your verdict. 
THE EVIDENCE WILL NOW BE PRESENTED 
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COURT COPY 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOSEPH HOSKINS, 
Defendant. 
SUPPLEMENTAL 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
Case No.: 041906257 
Assigned Judge: John R. Morris 
Members of the jury, attached hereto are supplemental jury instructions, numbered 22 
through 44, relating to the particular laws or rules that apply in this case. 
These instructions, together with the preliminary jury instructions given to you 
previously, govern your conduct and deliberations during the trial and must be carefully 
followed. 
You will take these instructions with you into the jury room for further reference. 
Dated: 
A <zJX< \AA/n^— 
John R. Morris, District Judge 
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Supplemental Jury Instructions 
March 9, 2005 
OP? 
LIST OF SUPPLEMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS 
22. INSTRUCTIONS ON THE LA W THAT APPLIES TO THIS CASE 1 
23. THE CRIMES CHARGED I 
24. COUNT I, ROBBERY. 2 
25. COUNT II, ASSAULT 3 
26. INTENT. 4 
27. DEFINITIONS 5 
28. WHO IS RESPONSIBLE TO CONVINCE THE JURY? 6 
29. HOW CONVINCED MUST THE JURY BE BEFORE DECIDING THE 
DEFENDANT IS GUILTY? 6 
30. WHAT IS A REASONABLE DOUBT? 6 
31. HOW TO EVALUATE DOUBT. 6 
32. WHAT TO TAKE WITH YOU INTO THE JURY ROOM 7 
33. WHAT TO DO IN THE JURY ROOM. 7 
34. CONSIDER EACH OTHER'S OPINION, THEN REACH YOUR OWN DECISION 
BASED UPON HONEST DELIBERATION 7 
35. WHA T TO DO IF YOU HA VE QUESTIONS DURING DELIBERA TION. 8 
36. FOCUS ON THIS CASE ALONE 8 
37. CHARTS. 9 
38. WHERE DEFENDANT DOES NOT TESTIFY. 9 
39. WHAT MAY YOUR VERDICTS BE? 10 
40. REACHING A VERDICT 10 
41. HOW TO REPORT YOUR VERDICT 10 
42. WHAT HAPPENS AFTER THE VERDICT HAS BEEN REPORTED 10 
43. CLOSING ARGUMENTS 11 
44. NO INTENT TO INFLUENCE 11 
VERDICT FORM 12 
Supplemental Jury Instructions C\ 
March 9, 2005 
22. 
INSTRUCTIONS ON THE LAW THAT APPLIES TO THIS CASE 
Members of the jury, I thank you for your attention during this trial. I will now explain 
the rules of law that you must follow and apply in deciding this case. When I have finished, you 
will go to the jury room and begin your discussions, what we call your "deliberations." 
The clerk has attached to your copy of these instructions some additional pages that 
contain instructions relating to the particular laws or rules that apply in this case. 
23. 
THE CRIMES CHARGED 
The State has charged the Defendant, Joseph Hoskins, with the following crimes: 
(Count I) Robbery; 
(Count II) Assault. 
To these charges, the Defendant has entered a plea of not guilty. This plea casts upon the 
State the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements of the crime charged. 
These elements are set forth in the following instructions. 
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24. 
COUNT I, ROBBERY 
Before you can convict the defendant, Joseph Hoskins, of the crime of, Count I, robbery, 
alleged to have been committed on or about August 17, 2004, in Weber County, State of Utah, 
you must find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the following elements of 
that crime: 
I. The defendant, Joseph Hoskins; 
II. Unlawfully and intentionally took or attempted to take; 
III. By means of force or fear; 
IV. Personal property then in the possession of L. Powell from L. Powell's 
person or immediate presence; 
V. Against L. Powell's will; 
VI. With a purpose or intent to temporarily or permanently deprive L. Powell 
of that personal property. 
If you are satisfied that all of the above elements have been proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt, then you must find the defendant guilty of the crime of, Count I, robbery, as charged in 
the amended information. If the evidence has failed to establish one or more of the elements 
listed above, then you must find the defendant not guilty. 
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25. 
COUNT II, ASSAULT 
Before you can convict the defendant of the offense of, Count II, assault, on or about 
August 17, 2004, in Weber County, State of Utah, you must find from the evidence, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, all of the following elements of that crime: 
I. The defendant, Joseph Hoskins; 
II. (a) attempted, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to 
another, namely L. Powell; OR 
(b) made a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, 
to do bodily injury to another, namely L. Powell; OR 
(c) committed an act, with unlawful force or violence, that caused bodily 
injury to another or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another, 
namely L. Powell; 
AND 
III. In doing so, the defendantthe-pessop caused substantial bodily injury to 
another, namely L. Powell. 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and all of the elements of the crime, as 
set forth above, beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant guilty of the 
offense of, Count II, assault. If, however, you are unable to find one or more of these elements 
beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant not guilty. 
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26. INTENT 
The crime charged requires a certain mental state in the mind of the perpetrator. Unless 
such mental state exists, the crime charged is not committed. 
The intent with which an act is done denotes a state of mind and connotes a purpose in so 
acting. Intent, being a state of mind, is seldom susceptible of proof by direct evidence and 
ordinarily must be inferred from acts, conduct, statements and circumstances. 
Intent and motive should never be confused. Motive is what prompts a person to act or 
fail to act. Intent refers only to the state of mind with which an act is done or omitted. Motive is 
not an element of any offense, and hence need not be proven. The motive of an accused is 
immaterial, except insofar as evidence of motive may aid in your determination of intent. 
A person engages in conduct intentionally, or with intent, when it is his conscious 
objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. 
Supplemental Jury Instructions 
March 9, 2005 - 4 - n
f7 0 
27. 
DEFINITIONS 
In these instructions, certain words and phrases are used that require definition to 
properly understand the nature of the crimes charged and to properly apply the law as contained 
in these instructions to the facts as you may find them from the evidence. These definitions are as 
follows: 
An "attempt" occurs if a person is acting with the kind of culpability otherwise 
required for the commission of an offense and engages in conduct constituting a substantial step 
towards commission of the offense. Conduct does not constitute a substantial step unless it is 
strongly corroborative of the person's intent to commit the offense. 
"Personal property" means anything of value. 
"Substantial bodily injury" means bodily injury, not amounting to serious 
bodily injury, that creates or causes protracted physical pain, temporary disfigurement, or 
temporary loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ. 
"Unlawful" means that which is contrary to law or unauthorized by law, or, 
without legal justification, or, illegal. 
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28. 
WHO IS RESPONSIBLE TO CONVINCE THE JURY? 
The State has the burden of proof. It has made the accusations in this case. The Defendant 
is not required to prove innocence-you must start by assuming it. Under our laws and 
constitution, the Defendant is presumed to be innocent unless proven guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt. This is intended to guard against the danger of an innocent person being convicted. 
29. 
HOW CONVINCED MUST THE JURY BE BEFORE DECIDING THE 
DEFENDANT IS GUILTY? 
Before you can give up your assumption that the Defendant is innocent, you must be 
convinced that the Defendant's guilt has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt does not require proof to an absolute certainty. It is that degree of proof that 
satisfies the mind and convinces the understanding of reasonable persons who are bound to act 
conscientiously upon it, and that obviates all reasonable doubt. 
30. 
WHAT IS A REASONABLE DOUBT? 
Reasonable doubt means doubt that is based on reason and is reasonable in view of all the 
evidence. It is based upon reason and common sense rather than fancy, imagination, speculation, 
supposition, emotion or sympathy. It is such as would be retained by reasonable persons after a 
full and impartial consideration of all the evidence, and must arise from the evidence or lack of 
evidence in the case. 
31. 
HOW TO EVALUATE DOUBT 
If, after full and impartial consideration of all the evidence in the case, you can candidly 
say that you are not satisfied of the Defendant's guilt, then you have a reasonable doubt. On the 
other hand, if, after an impartial consideration and comparison of all the evidence, you can truth-
Supplemental Jury Instructions 
March" 9, 2005 - 6 -
fully say that you have an abiding conviction of the Defendant's guilt, then you have no 
reasonable doubt. 
32. 
WHAT TO TAKE WITH YOU INTO THE JURY ROOM 
You may take the following things with you when you go into the jury room to discuss 
this case: 
• All exhibits admitted in evidence; 
• Your notes (if any); 
• Your copy of these instructions; and 
• The verdict form or forms. 
33. 
WHAT TO DO IN THE JURY ROOM 
The first thing you should do in the jury room is choose a person to be in charge. This 
person is called the "foreperson" or the "chair." The chair's duties are: 
• To keep order and allow everyone a chance to speak; 
• To represent the jury in any communications you make; and 
• To sign your verdict and bring it back in court. 
In deciding what the verdict should be, all jurors are equal. The chair has no more power 
than any other juror. 
34. 
CONSIDER EACH OTHER'S OPINION, THEN REACH YOUR OWN 
DECISION BASED UPON HONEST DELIBERATION 
Your attitude and conduct at the outset of your deliberations is very important. It is rarely 
productive or good for a juror, upon entering the jury room, to make an emphatic expression of 
opinion or to announce a determination to stand for a certain verdict. When that is done at the 
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outset, a person's sense of pride may block appropriate consideration of the case. Use your 
common memory, your common understanding, and your common sense. Talk about the case 
with each other as you ponder and deliberate. 
Your verdict must be your own. Don't make a decision just to agree with everyone else. 
However, you should respect and consider the opinions of the other jurors. If you are persuaded 
that a decision you initially made was wrong, don't hesitate to change your mind. Help each 
other arrive at the truth. Also, don't resort to chance or some form of decision-making other than 
honest deliberation. 
35. 
WHAT TO DO IF YOU HAVE QUESTIONS DURING DELIBERATION 
If you think you need more information or a clarification, write a note and give it to the 
bailiff. I will review it with the lawyers. We will answer your question whenever appropriate. 
However, these instructions should contain all the information you need to reach a verdict based 
upon the evidence. 
36. 
FOCUS ON THIS CASE ALONE 
Your duty is to decide this case and this case alone. You should not use this case as a 
forum for correcting perceived wrongs in other cases, or as a means of expressing individual or 
collective views about anything other than the guilt or innocence of this Defendant. Your verdict 
should reflect the facts you have found, applied to the law as explained in these instructions, and 
should not be distorted by any outside factors or objectives. 
This case must not be decided for or against anyone because you feel sorry for anyone or 
angry at anyone. You should not consider or be influenced by any rumors or opinions you may 
have heard or read out of court, or by public sentiment. It is your sworn duty to decide this case 
based on the facts and the law, without regard to sympathy, passion or prejudice. 
Remember, the lawyers are not on trial. Your feelings about them should not influence 
your decision in this case. 
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The final test of the quality of your service will be the verdict you return. You will 
contribute to efficient judicial administration if you focus exclusively on this case and return a 
just and proper verdict. 
37. 
CHARTS 
Certain charts have been shown to you in order to help explain the facts that are in 
evidence in the case. However, such charts are not in and of themselves evidence or proof of any 
facts. If such charts do not correctly reflect facts shown by the evidence in the case, you should 
disregard them. 
38. 
WHERE DEFENDANT DOES NOT TESTIFY 
The Defendant is not required to testify in his own behalf. The law expressly gives him 
the privilege of not testifying if he so desires. The fact that Defendant has not testified must not 
be taken as any indication of his guilt or innocence, and you must not presume or infer anything 
by reason thereof. The burden remains with the State, regardless of whether the Defendant 
testifies in his own behalf or not, to prove by the evidence his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
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39. 
W H A T M A Y YOUR VERDICTS BE? 
Your verdict must be in writing, signed by your foreperson, and must be returned by you 
into court. I will give you a form concerning the verdict choices. 
Your verdict in this case must be: 
GUILTY of the offense of, Count I, robbery; 
OR 
NOT GUILTY, as to Count I, as your deliberations may result. 
GUILTY of the offense of, Count II, assault; 
OR 
NOT GUILTY, as to Count II. 
40. 
REACHING A VERDICT 
This being a criminal case, your verdict must be unanimous; all jurors must agree. When 
you are all in agreement, then you have reached a verdict, and your deliberations are finished. 
41. 
H O W TO REPORT YOUR VERDICT 
When you have reached a verdict, the Chair should date and sign the verdict form that 
corresponds to your decision. Then notify the bailiff that you are ready to return to court. 
42. 
WHAT HAPPENS AFTER THE VERDICT HAS BEEN REPORTED 
After you have given your verdict to the judge, he or the clerk may ask each of you about 
it to make sure you agree with it. Then you will be excused from the jury box and you may leave 
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at any time. You may remain in the. courtroom, if you wish, to watch the rest of the proceedings, 
which should be quite brief. 
After you are excused, you may talk about the case with anyone. Likewise, you are not 
required to talk about it. If anyone attempts to talk to you about the case when you don't want to 
do that, please tell the Court Clerk. 
43. 
CLOSING ARGUMENTS 
After counsel have completed their closing arguments, the bailiff will escort you to the 
jury room, and you may commence your deliberations. When you have agreed and the verdicts 
have been signed, notify the bailiff that you have agreed, but do not reveal your verdicts to him. 
The foreperson must hold the verdicts until I instruct otherwise. 
44. 
NO INTENT TO INFLUENCE 
You are the exclusive judges of the facts and the evidence. It is your duty to render a just 
verdict based upon the facts and the evidence. 
In determining any fact in this case, you should not consider or be influenced by any 
statement made or any action taken by the Court that you may interpret as indicating the Court's 
views in this case. The Court has not intended to express or to give any opinion on what the 
proof shows or does not show, or what are or what are not the facts in the case. You are the sole 
and final judges of all questions of fact submitted to you, and you must determine such questions 
for yourselves from the evidence, without regard to what you believe the Court thinks. 
CLOSING ARGUMENTS BY COUNSEL 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOSEPH HOSKINS, 
Defendant. 
VERDICT 
Case No.: 041906257 
Assigned Judge: John R. Morris 
We, the jury impaneled to try the issues in the above-entitled matter, do hereby find the 
Defendant, Joseph Hoskins, 
As to Count I, robbery: 
GUILTY; 
OR 
NOT GUILTY. 
As to Count II, assault: 
GUILTY; 
OR 
NOT GUILTY. 
Dated this day of , 2005. 
FOREPERSON 
080 
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